>>1626
>It doesn't strike me as much of a statement, and at best a colour of nihilism
Not possible. If life is absurd, this suggests there is a non-absurd version of existence. If so, nihilism is false. If such a version of existence meta-exists, then it's entirely possible that it could be instantiated.
>>1628
>I realize that if through science I can seize phenomena and enumerate them, I cannot, for all that, apprehend the world.
"Through science I can see things, but not, for all that, see things." At best, Camus is attempting to talk about something else. He's asked the scientist the wrong question, and blaming the scientist for providing an unsatisfying answer to the question he wanted to ask, but didn't.
>>1641
>Any truth claim just seems ridiculous to me
Paradox. Not a real sentence, instead your misunderstanding of grammar.
"It is true [ridiculous] that all truth claims are ridiculous."
>>1647
>The only interesting philosophical question is suicide in an absurdist view
>Should we strike out with vigor and revolt against the inherent paradox that is living?
Shallow. The question of suicide is this: if we reproduce only for the sake of reproducing, wouldn't it also be completely valid to stop reproducing for the sake of not reproducing? Isn't non-existence at least as good as existence?
If we can't not-reproduce for the sake of not-reproducing, doesn't that imply that reproducing for the sake of reproducing must also be missing something important? In which case, taking the first statement for granted, we've found out way out of Absurdism. The universe does have a purpose, the question is merely finding and knowing it.
But, if we can not-reproduce for its own sake, it's clear that reproduction has no value. Which means non-reproduction also has no value. One of the major questions of our time is, "What is value? If we think we've found some, how do we check?" Few if any philosophers spend more time addressing this question than studiously avoiding its mention.