/ratanon/ - Rationalists Anonymous

Because I want to die.

Because it's a scam.

cause im a broke-ass nigga lmao

>>7601

same

first thing i do the day i have a steady income

If I were serious about living forever I would be preparing a massive journal of everything I could think of. Pictures, recordings, writings, brain scans etc. Everything you think a friendly basilisk from the future could use to bring you back. Mix this with cryonics and what information about you remains outside of this journal and you are set.

I am basically completely useless, and already take up too many resources. An efficient society would certainly have culled me already; to impose myself on the 23rd century would be preposterous.

Why do that, when I could just burn my money or throw it in a hole? Same result with much less work.

>>7605

It will not continue your subjective experience of existence, that's for sure. Nobody has continuos subjective experiences anyway, consider sleeping or being drugged out of brain activity. It just feels that way.

It will share your soul if the process is done well enough. If they made 10 copies and materialized them at the same time they would be 10 different persons who are identical "inside", having identical thoughts and then begining to diverge from each other as soon as they begin to exist.

Personally I think I won't care about being dead when I am so all is good.

>>7608

>How would you determine the nature of your subjective experience, save by subjectively experiencing it?

Why is determining the nature aka solving the hard problem of consciousness necessary in this case?

>That isn't what I imagine one soul sharing many bodies being like at all. It would be like having extra limbs. And extra brains, but I can't imagine how that would feel. (However, I can't imagine how that process would occur– it would mandate telepathy– ergo, I conclude that the copies will not be controlled by one soul.

Yeah those aren't a soul sharing 10 bodies but 10 different souls with 10 different subjective experiences (Remember there is no continuity), copy paste pretty much.

>I'd rather you not die, anon, but it is admittedly only a slight preference.

Free cryonics for everyone, very low on the list of priorities.

I want to die on some level. Not to the extent that I'm suicidal, but I do think 80 or so years is enough life for me.

MWIQI, baby.

Because its expensive as fuck. Not all of us are programmers and doctors you know.

>>7610

So do I, but I kinda also want to see what the world will be like 100 years from now.

>>7609

>>How would you determine the nature of your subjective experience, save by subjectively experiencing it?

Category error, type error, segfault, compiler barf, kernel panic, bluescreen.

Consciousness is subjectively continuous.

"Where is a movie between the frames it's made of?" When you'll understand that, you'll be deconfused as to the nature of Continuity.

>Why is determining the nature aka solving the hard problem of consciousness necessary in this case?

lol "hard" problem

>>That isn't what I imagine one soul sharing many bodies being like at all. It would be like having extra limbs. And extra brains, but I can't imagine how that would feel. (However, I can't imagine how that process would occur– it would mandate telepathy– ergo, I conclude that the copies will not be controlled by one soul.

Conflation. If you copy/paste me 9 times while I sleep, it's 10 equal copies that are all "me" in all relevant senses. If you copy me 10 times and destroy the original, each of the 10 copies is subjectively me.

>Yeah those aren't a soul sharing 10 bodies but 10 different souls with 10 different subjective experiences (Remember there is no continuity), copy paste pretty much.

If the copies share all their sensory inputs and memories with each other in a fully-connected mesh, then the common continuity is still "me." And the obviously most desirable option. (YAY TEN BACKUPS)

>>7615

>lol "hard" problem

How is it not hard?

Because the idea is, quite literally but in a very subtle way, impossible.

>>7617

Being resurrected after a cold sleep, I mean. It's like quantum teleportation. Whatever ends up on the other side, it ain't you.

>>7618

Even quantum-states and teleportation, I don't buy that. Sure, probably the brain that comes out on the other side of the teleporter is not quite identical to what come in to it—even if there are no quantum effects that will surely be the case due to limited precision measurements etc. But why should I think such differences affect whether it is "me" or not? My brain undergoes lots of tiny peturbations every second, but I stay me regardless.

>>7612

Do you really think that quantum immortality works?

>>7619

Kill yourself and find out.

>>7598

'Cuz I'm a broke-ass student (or, shortly, a drop-out) and life insurance is actually too big an expense for me. Also I'm not sure the odds are worth it unless I'm on an upper-middle-class salary.

I'm just going to place my bets in MWIQI, other "big world immortality" angles, and keeping diaries and shit in case of ancestor emulation/resurrections. This has the advantage that I won't have to stress out about dying in a way or place that makes me unrecoverable, so I can ride a motorbike or go hiking in the wilderness or BASE jump if I want. In theory, I mean.

>>7624

There are no souls, so there's nothing to magically transmit information from one body to another. Either I already am currently those people as well, or for some reason only this specific pattern *in this specific place* counts as "me" for whatever part of the universe is deciding whether I continue to be conscious, and if the former is the case then when this body dies I won't even know about it, because none of the rest of me can magically learn of it.

>>7626

I am a consciousness, a subjective experiencer, which may or may not be located within a single body. The lack of information transmission means I cannot tell whether I exist singularly or in parallel. The correct referent for "me" may be many bodies of varying degrees of similarity to me, and a myriad of experiences, but the experience of a brain or soul that magically controls multiple bodies and communicates between them is not possible within that myriad.

>>7627

what? it's not hard to imagine forks of yourself with synchronized sensoria and memories.

>>7625

> when this body dies I won't even know about it

you might come to suspect

>>7628

Maybe? I'm just trying to agree with the "doesn't transmit information to other bodies just because they are similar to you" point and argue that it doesn't contradict my point.

>>7629

I mean, I'm already able to suspect that some of the other instances of me have died, or that I die when I go to sleep because I'm a continuity of consciousness so yesterday's me is dead. I just have nothing elevating it above philosophical speculation.

Maybe if I quantum-suicide my way into a situation where I can actually feel pretty confident some other instance of me is dead, but I'm not getting that ambitious, I'm just trying to ward off my existential fears.

I don't have $200,000 lying around for a nonzero but still insignificant possibility. Hope to do it before 50, but it still seems like a really low probability.

Because I don't want to spend eternity with you people.

I don't believe I'm going to have to if I just play it safe for the next 50 or so years. If I get enough money to just _throw away_, I'll do it, yeah, but otherwise? Nah. Not that rich now, and when I get that kind of money I'll have other, higher-utility reasons for it for a while.

Imagine signing up for cryonics and then everyone gets cyborg bodies and virtual immortality the next day. You'd feel kind of scammed.

>>7633

Out of what? You do know that you just buy a life insurance police–term life if you're feeling lucky–plus membership in Alcor or something, right? So you'd be out like sixty bucks to Alcor plus five bucks for the first month's premium?

>>7634

Who the fuck buys term life for cryonics? I guess people who are very confident they the singularity is near, since "I'm gonna die in less than 20 years" is not normally considered "feeling lucky".

>>7635

It's not entirely crazy. Say you buy thirty years of term life; you're essentially betting that you can save up the $90k or whatever within thirty years. ($130 a month at 4% interest, or $70 at 7%.) If you're younger, you can do forty-year term life ($80 a month at 4%, $35 at 7%), which is *really* cheap.

It's not a bet that the singularity will show up; it's a bet that you can save that money better than the people backing your whole-life or universal-life insurance plan, which is… kind of reasonable. You take the difference in cost and put it in long-term investments.

1) Because this investigation of Alcor suggests it's a shitshow and I doubt the others are any better:

http://chronopause.com/chronopause.com/index.php/2011/05/29/a-visit-to-alcor/index.html

Maybe by the time I get older scientists will have perfected some better information-preserving technique like the whole-brain plastination described at http://www.overcomingbias.com/2012/06/plastination-is-near.html …but that brings me to:

2) Because I think the argument for quantum immortality is plausible, and if my brain rots and the information is lost, the most likely route for my pattern to continue might be that I find myself in a world where the simulation hypothesis is true and the simulators record everyone's pattern at death and create new copies to live on outside the simulation. And I'd rather wake up in some really advanced future capable of simulating whole universes than some much nearer-term future, since in the nearer term it seems more likely they won't have sorted out political issues surrounding the rights of uploads, and the issue how to monitor computing systems to make sure they secretly illegal contain trapped uploads, in which case I could wake up as a slave or in some psycho's virtual hell or something.

Who says I'm not?

If somebody infamous like Moldbug were put on ice, and then progressives built an AI that took over the world, do you think they would unfreeze and upload him to torture him or simply to prove him wrong?

>>13595

Moldbug is not famous, so nobody would care.

because I think the probability of success is extremely low, way less than 1%

>>13600

yeah and? if you don't get cryo'd you have 0% chance of coming back and also what use do you have for the money once you're dead anyway

>>13601

You could leave the money to your children, or to charity.

If you think the expected payoff of cryo is, say, <1 QALY then it seems reasonable to pass.

>>13601

You can spend money on improving your life expectancy.

>>13603

To the point where you no longer have enough assets to pay for cryo by the time you die?

>>13604

No, of course not. My assets are going to my kids.

>>13605

Based self-replicating anon. Gnon approves.

>>13744

>Implying that children are actually copies of oneself

As I said before pro-reproduction stuff is mostly a very large collection of pro-social nonsense.

I have a thought experiment for breeders. You have two choices.

1. Two clones of you are made and you die.

2. No clones of you is made and you remain alive.

>>7598

I would love to.

>>13771

3. Two clones of you are made and you remain alive.

4. No clone of you is made and you die.

>>13771

you're going to die either way, Anon

>>13776

>you're going to die either way, Anon

So why reproduction? It isn't really good for you.

>>13778

I am going to become as rich as possible and impregnate as many women as I can support. I will require that each of my children learn all that I've come to understand. This is my cosmic purpose. Attempts at deriving meaning from the machinery of reality are irreconcilably flawed; it's impossible to derive an ought from an is. The conscious mind exists to deceive oneself (the better to deceive others) into believing that one has nobler aspirations than mere reproduction. By shedding these delusions, I will achieve perfect harmony among all aspects of my psyche. Enjoy your arts and your leisure while you can, non-breeders. Though I will die, my DNA will rule the universe.

>>13807

Well I'M going to modify my copies into only experiencing purpose when they're eliminating yours. See you at Armageddon.

>>14450

how old are you ? just convert to judaism and move to the us

>>7612

>>7621

>>7623

>>7638

If quantum immortality is true, do you have arguments against quantum hell?

https://bqp.io/quantum-immortality-to-quantum-hell.html

>>7638

>http://chronopause.com/chronopause.com/index.php/2011/05/29/a-visit-to-alcor/index.html

>In one case, a patient’s head was removed in the field and, because they had failed to use a rectal plug, the patient had defecated in the PIB. The result was that feces had contaminated the neck wound, and Alcor personnel were seen pouring saline over the stump of the neck whilst holding the patient’s severed head over a bucket trying to wash the fecal matter off the stump. These are just a few of the grotesque problems I observed.

wow

>>14555

To evade hell, proactively commit suicide in response to negative life changes. Ideally, set up an explosive device that measures the neurotransmitter levels throughout your brain and detonates when something goes awry. Pray that you end up in the branches where a quantum miracle averts the negative life change rather than the branches where the device simply fails.

In terms of "arguments that quantum hell isn't real" all I have is the old doomsday argument, where if I had an eternity of hellish existence awaiting me, I would have been much more likely to find myself in said eternity than in a normal day of a plain old life when I woke up this morning.

>>14555

>quantum immortality