Mark Hertling
@MarkHertling
Here's a summary 🧵 of what has happened in the last 6 months, what's happening now, & some things I'm watching.
Russia’s ground forces have proven to be poorly led, ill-trained & with low morale, increasingly & significantly attritted in personnel & equipment (some sources now indicating that when they went into this fight in Feb most units were understrength), unable to regenerate. 2/
RU lacked the ability to execute combined arms operations (CAO’s), defined as combining infantry, tanks, fires (arty or air), engineers (for river crossings, demining operations, etc), aviation, intel, & logistics to seize, occupy, & defend land areas or secure ground. 3/
Executing CAOs is much more difficult than what many might comprehend. It takes years of developing the right kind of leaders and soldiers, getting the right equipment, having the right doctrine, doing the right kind of training & exercises, and…4/
having the right kind of govt to support those activities without grift or corruption. (It's what the US Army does at 3 different major training centers). It's more than “giving Ukraine everything they need” and believing it will automatically become a modern & capable force. 5/
Russia came into this fight thinking they could execute a “Desert Storm-like offensive” that would be completed in a few days . This was delusional. They lacked the leadership, training, equipment, to do it. Given RU culture & systems, they aren't capable of fixing this. 6/
The UA -while *relatively* well-trained, well-led, w/ high morale, & having support from their govt, citizens & having the will to continue the fight– also, unfortunately, does not currently have the training or the type of organizations & equipment for large scale CAO’s. 7/
Don’t get me wrong, UA *can* execute defensive operations, counterattacks, hasty attacks & smaller scale CAO’s. They are not yet capable of large-scale CAO's over large areas. BUT, they are adapting, training w/allies, incorporating new equipment, and doing so very quickly. 8/
The Donbas slugfest was a counterfire battle; limited maneuver, a battle of attrition. RU attempted to deplete UKR will w/ imprecise strikes against civilian targets. UA -w new weapons– targeted RU's logistics. The result: lack of territorial gains by either side. 9/
In the S., RU's goal of achieving operational obj required occupation of ground. They were not able to do that due to poor maneuver capability & bad leadership, so they relied on a scorched earth campaign. Result: destruction of infrastructure & an attempt to seize/secure…10/
cities as limited objectives. Holding onto that (securing objectives) is extremely hard in a contested environment.
Russia is now stalled in the south & can only resupply from Rostov-on-Don (in Russia) or from Russian bases in Crimea (which is now being threatened).11/
-In the S, UA is now targeting logistics & supply lines with precision “fires” (arty, air, special ops, resistance saboteurs), while defending & conducting limited attacks to regain ground with conventional forces.
They’re also conducting a guerilla campaign. 12/
Defined: guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular warfare where small groups of combatants -paramilitary personnel, armed civilians, or irregulars- use ambushes, sabotage, raids, hit-and-run, assassinations, etc) to fight a larger and less-mobile traditional military.13/