/qresearch/ - Q Research

>>11868534

We're up to 52 Shark Weeks a year, now.

>>11868522

>>11868508

>Can you personally verify all hardware including chips including all firmware all by yourself?

See the part where I said that it is possible (and actually pretty easy) to make a secure hardware design with insecure hardware.

Learn electronics. It is a lot easier than people think. Software is WAY harder. I learned this accidentally and now wish I'd learned electronics decades ago because it is so friggin' easy.

>Implying such a safe language can not produce any security issues.

Not at all. Bugs can easily cause security problems. However, that's what debugging is for. Systems will servo toward being secure. The safe language assures you don't get stupid shit like buffer overflow exploits, memory leaks, wild pointers, etc. That covers most of the actual surface area of exploits. Make a system that is good enough and developers will be on it like an ant hill. Give it a few years of beating and you'll have a robust system.

Also, 99% of the people can barely tie their shoes and won't be able to check code changes. They'll have to trust someone. Such is the way of the world with everything. So, you have to achieve a critical mass sufficient so there are enough smart people that others can trust to not fuck the system all to hell. Look at /qresearch/ and look at what we're capable of. A very small percentage of vigilant patriots would be able to check code changes and blow whistles quickly. Also keep in mind that adding systems into the operating system that make this easy would happen.

Special note: C/C++ were designed to be insecure. Look up Multics, then find the Air Force attacks. Most of it is declassified. Then connect the dots. The cabal tactically sabotaged computing for all of us. Have a nice day.

>Nonsense.

Believe what you want.

>Software programming is very difficult.

>If it was possible to make it that easy, someone would have already done so.

Then stay incapable and let others do it for you. Asshat.

just saw this. intensity is intensifying intensely

>>11868514

>Could you piggyback existing infrastructure networks

Yes and no…. They're just pipes for bits. If you can send/receive bits, then you're good. If someone can cut your cord, then you're fucked. What I mentioned doesn't attempt to address that problem, but it is a potential valid problem. I suggest governmental regulation is the only thing that could come close to solving that. So, clean up the gov't. first.

If you're talking about anti-surveillance, there are fairly easy ways to make yourself opaque to everyone, including NSA. Not good to talk about unless you like becoming an NSA target in a jiffy. But yes, it is possible to make your comms completely un-decipherable if you're willing to have physical control over both endpoints.

>>11868555

>That why Dennis Ritchie says to use Ada instead?

I have no idea, but I wouldn't trust Ada either.

If I don't control the entire hardware/software (everything), then I don't trust the system.

Guess what I'm working on!

>>11868569

The world economy pretty much depends on an internet-like communications system at this point. The only 'gotcha' I see that could frustrate that is cabal-like interference. If Q is legit, then that won't be a problem.

If Q is not legit…well….get used to turnips.