/pnd/ - Politics, News, Debate

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program

* The LCS are essentially offshore patrol vessels and minesweepers, yet have an annualized life cycle cost per ship that is 90% of an Aegis destroyer and 329% of an Avenger class minesweeper [1 p25]

* The first Independence class ships delivered were rapidly dissolving due to galvanic corrosion [2]

* The Freedom class combining gear breaks down constantly [3]

* Supposed to have an anti-submarine module, yet no anti-submarine modules are ready 12 years after the first LCS was commissioned [4 p12]. The LCS ships have a design life of 25 years [1 p25].

> "During the MCM mission package Technical Evaluation (TECHEVAL), the Navy demonstrated that an LSC (sic) could detect, classify, identify, and neutralize only a fraction of the mines in the Navy’s mine clearance scenarios while requiring extraordinary efforts from shore support, maintenance personnel, and contractors " [5]

[1] https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664672.pdf

[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-06-17/navy-finds-aggressive-corrosion-on-austal-s-combat-ship-1-

[3] https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/12/15/the-us-navy-is-investigating-a-potential-lcs-class-wide-design-flaw/

[4] https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/FY_2019_SARS/20-F-0568_DOC_51_LCS_MM_SAR_Dec_2019_Full.pdf

[5] https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2015/navy/2015lcs.pdf?ver=2019-08-22-105642-770

DDG-1000 program

* The entire ship was designed around the naval gunfire support concept [1 p6], which is arguably obsolete because of the widespread proliferation of long-range anti-ship missiles.

* Guns can only use specialized ammunition, which was cancelled. So now they are just really expensive dead weights. [1 p6]

* Originally, the ship was designed to have both the AN/SPY-4 S-band radar and the AN/SPY-3 X-band radar. S-band is optimal for range, while X-band is optimal for resolution. The AN/SPY-4 was cancelled, which means the ship can't do long range air defense effectively. [1 p29]

* Cancelled with only 3 units ordered at a total cost of $22.5bn [1 p27 & p28]

* Supposed to have a sleek exterior for radar stealth, yet the navy has bolted on extra stuff that negates the stealth. [2]

[1] https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32109.pdf

[2] https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/25018/pics-of-uss-zumwalt-while-replenishing-at-sea-show-yet-another-non-stealthy-antenna

Ford-class program

The USS Ford was officially delivered in 2017 and commissioned in 2018, yet the ship was far from finished.

* The weapons elevators didn't work reliably, and the last won't be accepted until summer 2021 at the earliest. [1]

* Won't deploy until 2022 at the earliest, or maybe 2024 [2]

> "Through the first 747 shipboard launches, EMALS [= catapults] suffered 10 critical failures" [3]

> "The reliability concerns are exacerbated by the fact that the crew cannot readily electrically isolate EMALS components during flight operations due to the shared nature of the Energy Storage Groups and Power Conversion Subsystem inverters on board CVN 78. The process for electrically isolating equipment is time-consuming; spinning down the EMALS motor/generators takes 1.5 hours by itself. The inability to readily electrically isolate equipment precludes EMALS maintenance during flight operations. " [3]

> "Through the first 747 attempted shipboard landings, AAG [= advanced arrestor gear] suffered 10 operational mission failures " [3]

>" The reliability concerns are magnified by the current AAG design that does not allow electrical isolation of the Power Conditioning Subsystem equipment from high power buses, limiting corrective maintenance on below-deck equipment during flight operations. " [3]

> "CVN 78 will likely be short of berthing spaces. […] The berthing capacity is 4,660 […] Recent estimates of expected combined manning of CVN 78, its Air Wing, embarked staffs, and detachments range from 4,656 to 4,758. " [3]

[1] https://news.usni.org/2020/04/16/fords-5th-weapons-elevator-done-with-testing-all-11-should-be-done-by-next-summers-shock-trials

[2] https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/09/14/heres-when-the-navy-thinks-the-carrier-ford-will-be-able-to-deploy/

[3] https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2019/navy/2019cvn78.pdf?ver=2020-01-30-115502-643

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program

* The program is structured so that only a single private company will have the experience and expertise to develop and manufacture advanced fighter aircraft in the entire US, meaning the DoD now suffers from total vendor lock-in forever.

* By having zero alternatives, distributing work to 45 states [1], promising the plane to foreign countries, and including foreign subcontractors, the program was structured to be uncancellable.

* This obviously led to massive delays and cost overruns. [2]

* Carrier variant has less combat range than Chinese anti-ship missiles. [3, 4]

* One of the main selling points of the F-35 is radar stealth, especially in the frontal arc [5]. The F-35C is to be the principal carrier-based strike aircraft. Yet it can only carry two small anti-ship missiles while preserving stealth. The F-35B marine version cannot carry any anti-ship missiles while preserving stealth. [6]

>"at extremely high altitudes, the U.S. Navy’s and Marine Corps’ versions of the F-35 jet can only fly at supersonic speeds for short bursts of time before there is a risk of structural damage and loss of stealth capability. The problem may make it impossible for the Navy’s F-35C to conduct supersonic intercepts." [7]

[1] https://www.f35.com/about/economic-impact

[2] https://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/f-35-fighter-plane-costs-103579

[3] https://www.foxnews.com/tech/pentagon-calls-chinas-test-of-df-21d-and-df-26-anti-ship-missiles-destabilizing

[4] https://www.usna.edu/NavalAviation/FixedWingAircraft/F35C_Lightning_II.php

[5] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm

[6] https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/03/13/japan-inks-deal-with-kongsberg-for-f-35-standoff-missile/

[7] https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/04/24/the-pentagon-will-have-to-live-with-limits-on-f-35s-supersonic-flights/

Army modernization

* Future Combat Systems cancelled in 2009 after $14bn spent with almost nothing to show for it [1 p49]

* Such programs have managed to spend $32bn since 1995 with almost nothing to show for it [2]

[1] https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1206.html

[2] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2018/07/12/army-to-unveil-details-about-new-futures-command-in-biggest-reorganization-in-45-years/