/philosophy/ - Philosophy

The is-ought-problem does not point towards a fallacy. You cannot adequately describe many objects without bringing in normative elements. For example, how would you define a car without mentioning that it ought to drive?

Ethical truths are objective because the facts from which they are derived are, likewise, objective.

The problem of induction has not been solved, from what I know. For this very reason, empiricists are all dumbasses.

>>4768

empiricism has its uses outside of the realm of thought, its the (oh how loathesome a term,) scientisimists that take it beyond its purview like black science man, fedoras, etc, that are the problem.

A car is a thing designed to drive on its own voilition, and is synonymous with automobiles: a thing that by etymology moves itself automatically "by itself." How is that definition not objective rather than normative? You are just getting lost in semantics. True, a thing that is shaped like a car could now be called a car, but that is because the form itself now has a word in the post-buggy era.

People using the word car normatively like so, do not detract from the original and common meaning of a thing designed to move by itself, i.e. mechanically.

And what would you consider an ethical truth, if such things do exist?

>>4768

In my understanding of the is-ought problem, the issue is that what is cannot be used to ascertain what ought to be. There is no "causal" relationship between the two. In your view, description has both of these elements simultaneously, and I see no real argument against that. However, the problem is not of description, it is of moving from somewhat uncontroversial facts, what is, to highly disputed ones, what ought to be. While something common like a car may be easy for everyone to agree on, something like the direction of a country, or a business, or even a household is not so easy. The ought of the description of an object might not be so well agreed upon.

Also, you say without hesitation that there are objective ethical truths. Could you name one? And by objective do you use it in the classical sense or the modern one? I would caution you, I disagree with the idea of objective ethical truth in both ways.

Lastly, yes, empricists and hard materialists are retarded. Schopenhauer destroyed them 150 years ago.

>>4778

>>4778

>And what would you consider an ethical truth, if such things do exist?

Are you asking me (OP)?

Regardless, it's hard to say. I guess it would be a true statement which logically follows from true premises, e.g. some proof of natural rights, I personally don't believe these exist in any meaningful way as an atheist.

>>4768

>The problem of induction has not been solved, from what I know. For this very reason, empiricists are all dumbasses.

Induction can only prove that a conclusion is highly likely, not that it is certain, how does this mean that it is useless? It is the sole method we rely upon for epidemiological studies, for example.

This goes for >>4783 too ("empiricists are retarded")

>>4785

The problem isn't the high likelihood of induction, it is relying on induction only. To clarify, I only mean those who are solely empiricists are retarded, which doesn't mean that empirical proofs or thinking is worthless. It is just they can't quite "prove" anything

>>4785

Highly likely is as good as 'I don't know so here is a guess' when it comes to logic. Philosophy isn't interested in guessing, it's interested in knowing.

The is/ought problem isn't a problem except for scientism kiddies and cavemen (radical empiricists). Of fucking course you can't draw necessary universals (natural laws) from contingent individuals. Of fucking course you can't draw necessary ends from contingent determinate sense experience. The only way to draw a should from an is is with a Hegelian auto determining concept since what the concept is is fly what it should be by it's own free logical development.