>>98124
>People can't just get the will to do something. There needs to be an affect. Something can be tried the first time but you may fail. The second time you'll attempt to do something but you'll succeed. why? Doesn't seem very free
Yes, that was my original posited definition of an "unfree will". But life conditions still are irrelevant to the question of whether the will has agency or not.
>It shows that people can be easily hypnotized into thinking they have free will
That doesn't have anything to do with determining whether the statement is true or false. It might be a rebuttal to an appeal to popularity, but no one has made that appeal.
>And why does your brain make these snap decisions? There are predetermined factors that affect everything. You could have mental illness, low blood sugar. For example you could think you're choosing a TV but it's already determined by your brand preference or the price of the tv. Maybe you got the brand preference because when you were a kid your parents had that TV brand in the house
Yes, it's commonly accepted that many different factors influence the appeal of decisions. But the question of free will is not how the will decides, but whether the will is actually deciding at all. Outside influences still allow for the possibility of the will possessing the potency necessary to act as the arbiter for conscious (not unconscious) decisions.
>You is your body
The brain is part of the body, yes?
>Also the brain has implicit decision making that you're not aware of.
i.e. unconscious decision making. But conscious decision making also exists, and it is this form of decision making in which the question of whether the will has any measurable affect has any relevancy at all. Few if any proponents of free will will argue that the will is able to control unconscious actions.
>Actions are moral and immoral but people do not have control over their actions. But what is moral is putting away the person who killed someone to benefit the greater good to protect more people from being killed.
>The brain gives happiness or any other moods value.
You seem to be going by a utilitarian moral framework here, but the argument that actions have moral value only because a brain ascribes value to them cannot adequately defend the utilitarian world view. Correct me if I'm wrong, but you seem to believe that every individual has a moral duty to maximize the positive emotions of humanity and minimize the negative emotions of humanity. Therefore it is moral to prevent the murderer from killing people and immoral to punish the murderer for an event not in his control. The statement that brains experience happiness or suffering certainly is true – but it doesn't come close to supporting the utilitarian thesis that every individual has a moral duty to manage happiness and suffering on a communal, or even global scale. Furthermore, it seems extremely dubious to me that the concept of moral duty can exist at all without individual agency. The statement that someone has violated their moral duty does not really mean anything if it is impossible to hold them accountable for that act.
>Elaborate, I'm a bit confused
Your previous statements indicate that you believe that human happiness and human suffering have intrinsic value. I am curious as to how you have reached that conclusion when you also believe that humans have no agency. Without agency, without a will, what separates humans from other entities that do not possess agency? What is it about them that you find special enough to proclaim that causing them to enter into specific emotional states is immoral?