/liberty/ - Liberty

>>58283

I don't mind him as I like to read from both Austrian and Chicago schools of thought. They are practically the only schools defending capitalism and liberty in a world slowly being devoured by socialist policies. However, I do feel Murphy won that debate. Friedman may have spoken more eloquently but Murphy was able to get his points across better.

>>58283

I find Friedman's emphasis on efficiency and pragmatic concerns to be helpful when having discussions with people who are unmoved by ethical arguments. When someone's primary concerns are of a practical nature, it helps to be able to answer those concerns on their own terms.

I also found his book, "Legal Systems Very Different From Ours" to be very helpful in a few ways. For one, it broadens people's horizons in terms of thinking about what law is. For another, it provides a comparative analysis of numerous different legal systems, and a proof of concept for polycentric law. Finally, it helps to clarify some misconceptions many people have with regard to various systems of religious law. It also touches a bit on the idea that the way we do things now really hasn't been around all that long, so obviously it isn't the only way things can be.

All in all, if your aim is rhetorical efficacy, it helps to have a variety of different thinkers and approaches at your disposal. Understand your interlocutor's concerns and motives, and tailor your approach to answering those. Friedman's work serves that purpose nicely.

>>58283

I've never read any of his works besides "Legal Systems Very Different From Ours" (and I should probably read more before properly saying anything about his material) but at the end of the day the fact that he comes from a Chicago School perspective seems to create more problems than it would solve.

Machinery of Freedom is a pretty highly respected book as far as I can tell, and I've seen plenty of people quote his commentary on the economy when making a point, even if these are only the beliefs held in common between Austrian and Chicagoan schools. It happens to be that consequentialist and deontological reasoning are both on the same page regarding ideals, and MoF is one of the greatest works of consequentialist libertarian thought.

Milton Friedman got me to think about free markets to begin with, David Friedman got me the rest of the way there, but it was Hoppe I respect because he got me to stay.

>>58283

>utilitarian

And this is why. For whatever reason, utilitarian arguments don't have the same rhetorical staying power for a lot of people as some other, loftier, forms of ethics.

In other words, a million times what >>58293 just said.

>>58316

>>58283

I wonder why people keep calling consequentialists utilitarians

consequentialism is the pure form, utilitarianism is one of several subschools

utilitarians are hedonistic consequentialists

>>58316

>For whatever reason, utilitarian arguments don't have the same rhetorical staying power for a lot of people as some other, loftier, forms of ethics.

Interesting question. I think it's hard to really get behind utilitarian judgements, for a number of reasons. Act utilitarianism will force you to accept conclusions that you find revolting, for example that it's right to kill a hospital patient and harvest his organs to save a few other ones. Yet these conclusions always have an element of uncertainty to them. What if the patient you killed was developing a highly potent antidote to tetanus? In that case, all you can say is that you tried your best to fulfill the commandment of a moral philosophy that doesn't care about your sentiments. Rule utilitarianism, meanwhile, will always have you wondering if it isn't okay to break this rule just this one time to help the other hospital patients. If you do and don't get caught, then your action undeniably had a net-benefit. All this considered, utilitarianism isn't satisfying on a psychological level. Too much uncertainty, you cannot take an absolutist stance on anything, it's cognitively too demanding, and I'm pretty sure the list goes on.

>>58425

I know the difference, but I still thought he was a utilitarian and not just a consequentialist. Now that you mention it, what he said didn't conclusively point towards him being a utilitarian.

>>58440

>these conclusions always have an element of uncertainty to them

all real world decisions have some uncertainty, unless and actor is omniscient

so I would discount that objection

by the way

an educated guess is never worse than the arbitrary guess

(though the actual outcomes might be – were talking about the expected value of the decision)

>Rule utilitarianism, meanwhile

I really dont see how anyone can defend virtue ethics (while staying logically correct)

>utilitarianism isn't satisfying on a psychological level

its generally true, unfortunately

though some sociopaths might disagree about satisfaction

>Too much uncertainty

Id point out (this is not your point I think, but noteworthy) you cannot get rid of uncertainty

you can talk it away, using morals, religion/indoctrination or such means (i.e. 'rules'), but it arises from lack of knowledge and the mentioned methods do nothing to remedy that

>you cannot take an absolutist stance on anything

thats not actually true

however you dont have arbitrary rules (like moral) - the main feature of greater good idealogies. if you want (to aim for) absolutely correct actions, they are the only way

at least on the philosophical level. morals as heuristics is fine/viable.

so the almost inverse is the case: you inherently take an absolute stance on everything; to evalue every decision on its own, choosing to employ heuristics as you see helpful

>>58440

>it's cognitively too demanding

the tradeoff of course is, if you categorically rely on heuristics for decision making, or perhaps even build some institution or social space where want to punish deviation from them, you will get suboptimal or wildly incorrect decisions

as an example, under christianity human lives are assigned infinite value. and all the same value. even though theres clearly a difference

>>58444

>an educated guess is never worse than the arbitrary guess

Once you factor in Dunning-Kruger and our perceptions of ourselves to be making 'educated guesses,' I sincerely doubt this.

>>58446

oh yes, the mathematical proof is for *trigger warning* rational actors

philsophically / in the abstract world everything holds up nontheless

so this objection does not refute consequentialism on the philsophical level

if you want to make some pragmatic implementations because 'humans are stupid', thats very much fine with me.

in fact I think youre right and so far my best solution is siphoning lq humans' ressources - aka meritocracy, of some kind. not using a state, but capitalism. so apple style market (social pressure onto people who dont have the latest device) etc should be good

however utilitarian ethics (wich many mistake as 'greater good' are fairly popular. so I think its far too late to keep it secret.

Id also point out theres an assortion of large scale (thus high impact) decisions to made/beeing made all over the world. wich epistemology do you want to be employed for those?

and another thing is, decision making theory literacy may be low. however for example economic literacy is also (very) low. and yet, giving people a bunch of money still works fairly well. the point is that executed quality does not have to be very high in order for some epistemology to be better

and again, philosophically it holds up (so far)

of course we should come up with stuff to increase quality of decision made with capital

maybe make some marxist religion telling people to give their stuff away?

>>58444

>>utilitarianism isn't satisfying on a psychological level

>its generally true, unfortunately

>though some sociopaths might disagree about satisfaction

I thought about it

ultimately it is the only satisfying one

only truth can be ultimately satisfying