>>40297
Your tone is hostile and you don't want to read walls of text, so I'll try to keep this short and blunt.
Nothing in that video was new. It was a very simple summary of the basic problem which I'm already familiar with.
A perfect copy of me is me in absolutely every measurable way. There is no reason to believe that being destructively teleported would be any different to blacking out and then waking up. There is a lot less difference between the copy and the original than there is between you yesterday and you today. If both versions are alive, then they will begin to diverge, at which point they might be considered different people, but even then I'd be quite happy to die if I knew an almost perfect copy of me was going to have a happy life. There isn't a sharp divide between me and not-me; There's a continuum, and taken to its logical conclusion this line of reasoning leads to a very compassionate, utilitarian outlook.
By definition, a dead person cannot experience anything or feel anything. I cannot care if I am dead, just as all the possible people who have never been born can't care about the unfairness of not existing. It is an ethical zero - neither bad nor good. Suicide, assuming it's even subjectively possible, is a great way to deal with any situations where your expected total future happiness is negative.
>>40298
Assuming many worlds is true, there an an almost infinite number of universes where you never existed. In fact, the universes not containing humans outweigh the universes containing humans by quite a few orders of magnitude. Don't worry about the timelines where you are dead. Focus on the ones where you're alive.