/liberty/ - Liberty

That would require quantifying abstract, subjective concepts like utility or happiness.

>>71931

Why is that a problem?

>>71932

Just like The Sims.

>>71932

It's currently impossible to systematize and process. We know there are objective principles behind every decision. That doesn't mean we can properly calculate with the insufficient data.

>>71930

>If praxeology is so logical why is it not mathematically formalized?

Because Mises came from an era and a place where language was seen as capable of carrying abstract ideas. That's a tradition that's as old as language itself, you know. It only changed with the analytical idiocy of such people as Bertrand Russel, who divorced ontology from philosophy and thus concluded that the proper use of philosophy was in describing the relation of signs to each other. What they couldn't do was establish that the signs themselves signified anything existing in reality. Which brings me to this:

>That would surely force all honest person to admit that it is indeed completely logical and has no errors or hidden assumptions or whatever.

Mises did not describe the relation of arbitrary concepts towards each other. The action-axiom purports to be grounded in reality. Whether it actually is cannot be expressed through a more formal language. All that such language could do would be to uncover whether there are any chains in his argument that are logically weak, but I think English is sufficient for that. Few people doubt whether his reasoning is logical in this sense, anyway, they doubt his central premise. And - again - you cannot prove or disprove them by just switching languages. Which is what expressing them in formal logic amounts to.

>>71934

Who's talking about calculations and data?

>>71936

Because without calculation mathematical expressions are nothing more than tautology.

>>71937

How do you think proofs work?

>>71935

There are critiques that attack the reasoning itself, for example:

https://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.hu/2011/01/mises-on-ricardian-law-of-association.html

Formalized it could be much easier, to an extent even automatically checked.

>>71938

Proof is data that when perceived remains consistent with the axioms of logic. I don't need to express knowledge in a specific format to make use of it. Math deals with strictly quantitative relations and is useful only then. It is subordinate to logic.

>>71939

This blog. I have known it for several months now. The guy seems quite educated, but he's still full of shit. I like what he says here:

>An assumption about “real conditions of the external world” is a synthetic proposition. If the “question whether or not the real conditions of the external world correspond to these assumptions is to be answered by experience,” then we need empirical evidence.

Yes, and Mises never claimed anything else. He was very transparent about which of his claims belonged to the realm of a priori reasoning and which required some empirical proof. The disutility of labor, for example, is based on (trivial) empirical observation. And in economic history, obviously observation of the facts is essential.

>And we can add to Mises’ last sentence: if the answer is in the negative, then the conclusions drawn even by valid praxeological reasoning do not describe what is going on in reality. They describe a non-existent, fantasy world.

Here, too. Mises would've wholeheartedly agreed with him, then wondered why the guy sounded like he was gloating. You do not know which laws of praxeology apply to a given, concrete case unless you know the facts of the case. How this blogger can act like this was some great insight is beyond me. I learned this within two weeks at law school.

I won't criticize this much further, for now, because it's late and because it's really not relevant for the OP. First, if the blogger is correct, then Mises was wrong on something, but his methodology is not invalidated and praxeology is untarnished. Second, your criticism doesn't apply to Mises, then, but to anyone who describes any abstract laws and subsumes under them. Which, you can easily tell, includes everyone.

Oh, and if you think Galbraith is a proper economist, then you're an idiot, plain and simple.

Honestly, I have a feeling you found this blogger and then felt confident that you can totally refute everything we say with ease. I suspect that because I could swear he wrote that Mises is wrong, because he doesn't write in the language of formal logic. (Of course, he himself wrote that in plain English.)

>>71940

Well said.

>>71939

"Once capital becomes extremely mobile internationally, we no longer have comparative advantage, but absolute advantage. It is not at all clear that free trade under “absolute advantage” is beneficial to all nations."

That's called an assertion. That "absolute advantage" was already considered both by Ricardo (even though the theory probably belonged to Mill instead) and Mises himself. Economic laws don't change with time exactly because they are based on immutable logical principles. What was true then is true now as well and forever. It is impossible to be literally "good for nothing." For that to happen humanity would have to have specific static wants with no new and lower priorities. For "absolute advantage" to create obsolete humans you'd need to have "absolute satisfaction".

>The neoclassical and Misesian argument for free trade is dependent on the capital of one country remaining in that country and being put to work in some other productive domestic industry, where comparative advantage lies.

Mises never referred to an aggregates and countries as an economic unit. This is someone trying to insert his interpretation into Mises's theory. A country does not trade, Individuals do and he stresses on that enough.

>Movement of capital to a place where it has absolute advantage simply causes de-industrialization in Western countries, as capital moves to nations with the lowest unit labour costs, and higher wage countries experience falling wages and high unemployment

The country is not a single actor. Find any one quote where Mises talks about aggregates when describing economic action. Not all wages everywhere have to be affected, nor does there have to be a decrease in real wages, rather than nominal. Less assertions, more arguments.

>With the collapse of manufacturing and other production, nations suffer higher unemployment and higher trade deficits.

Muh manufacturing sector fixation. Neither unemployment, nor trade deficits have any meaning without the context of their being. Having to give less for more isn't a concern. Being unemployed in of itself doesn't mean you're worse off than before and that you will never find employment. You need to assume premises first to make both negatives. Something which the author is doing while trying to condemn.

>Capital does not simply move from one domestic sector to another where comparative advantage lies, because of international capital mobility and the drive for lower wages and higher profits

That assumption reeks of Socialism and Marx's profit definition. This guy is trying to criticize a completely different theory while not using it to test its logical consistency. "Proof" does not look like that. Every single objection this guy has has been previously answered or is already addressed in Mises's writing. This post has absolutely nothing original to add and manages to be wrong as everyone before.

>Reliance on primary commodity exports whose prices are subject to volatility is not a successful strategy for economic development in most countries; in fact, such countries reliant on primary commodities and service industries are usually poor developing nations

More Socialist assumptions and classifications. There are no "primary" commodities in a subjective economy. There are no non-volatile prices. There are no static prices. This is rife with Leftist ideological assumptions and any reference to Neo Classicals outside of Mises's school doesn't suffice to cover it.

>Comparative advantage operates on the assumption of unchanged technology and constant returns to scale

It doesn't. This guy doesn't get the theory. The conditions that render it true are independent of external fluctuations. It is rooted into human action itself. You can't refute logic with experience when you use logic to interpret that experience. Mises knows that well. The theory of Comparative Advantage does not belong to Mises personally, but is fully contained and follows from the axiom of human action.

As long as humans want to improve their state of being there will be ever more ways to efficiently employ their time in satisfying them in a way that goes from the highest priority want down to lower. For that to ever change you would require a completely static world of immortal individuals not only with perfect knowledge of all, but perfect ability as well in a state of absolute satisfaction.

It's another case of not understand the difference between the fundamental principles of logic and experience.

>>71944

not understanding*

>>71937

Have you ever studied number theory? or at least discreet math?

>>71931

>utility is subjective

>formalization requires quantification

>>71934

>That doesn't mean we can properly calculate with the insufficient data.

consider these concepts: approximation, projecting outcome(s) with some certainty (0..1)

the deciding question is whether its better than the alternatives.

>It's currently impossible to systematize and process

you mean building qualitative models and calculate?

>>71937

now I see..

stick to fields you have adequate knowledge about mate. its ok to acknowledge natural differences and diversities and their implications for specialization etc

>>71935

>The action-axiom purports to be grounded in reality

always wondered about this

if you induce some statement via empiricism its not an axiom

>>71988

It's not empirical, though. You don't observe that human beings act, you know it because it's inconceivable that any human being could ever disprove it.

>>71930

I've wondered this myself. I've put some work into it, and I'd like to think I've made some progress on it, but I don't consider myself sufficiently expert in the field of praxeology to offer an authoritative treatment.

I suppose it may be that economists don't tend to have an academic background in symbolic logic, leaving them to use more organic language when describing logical axioms.

>>71931

>>71934

I'm afraid you're mistaken. Depending on how you want to classify things, you can describe logic as a type of mathematics, or mathematics as a kind of logic. Formal symbolic logic, without quantitative computation, can be accurately described as "mathematical".

>>71935

>Because Mises came from an era and a place where language was seen as capable of carrying abstract ideas.

This sounds plausible.

>It only changed with the analytical idiocy of such people as Bertrand Russel, who divorced ontology from philosophy and thus concluded that the proper use of philosophy was in describing the relation of signs to each other.

This is interesting. I've long lamented the dismal decline of philosophy leading into modern "thought", but hadn't considered this particular episode. I'll have to examine this more.

>The action-axiom purports to be grounded in reality. Whether it actually is cannot be expressed through a more formal language. All that such language could do would be to uncover whether there are any chains in his argument that are logically weak, but I think English is sufficient for that.

I'm not sure about this part, though, if I understand you correctly. I think praxeology identifies logically necessary axioms within a given set of definitions, thus establishing that any real-world items or events which are accurately described by those definitions must be logically constrained by those axioms. The bridge between the axiomatic and the empirical must lie in determining whether the objects and events under discussion conform to the definitions on which our praxeological investigation is founded. To this end, I see no reason why we cannot provide sufficiently formalized definitions.

>>71940

>Proof is data that when perceived remains consistent with the axioms of logic.

"Proof" (uncountable) refers to the body of evidence that corroborates an empirical claim. "Proofs" (countable) describe collections of propositions which demonstrate the logical necessity of a given relationship, principle, axiom, etc. You can never have "proof" of the Pythagorean Theorem because it isn't an empirical proposition, but you can have "A proof" of it, which demonstrates that it must be the case. Such analytical propositions are not falsifiable, and so any attempt at empirical corroboration encounters logical problems.

>>71986

>consider these concepts: approximation, projecting outcome(s) with some certainty (0..1)

This works pretty well for merely unknown quantities, but it doesn't work for things which cannot be quantified, such as individual preferences. It isn't merely that we don't know the value; it's that quantity cannot accurately describe these concepts.

That said; he is mistaken. Quantification is not necessary for formalization.

>>71988

The Action Axiom is best proven through a disjunctive syllogism: "Man acts" is a proposition which can have one of two truth values: true or false. If we are able to demonstrate that one value produces a logical contradiction, then by elimination we show that the other value is logically necessary. Since asserting that "man acts" is false necessarily requires man to act in doing so, this in principle generates a performative contradiction. There can be no argument that man does not act which does not contradict itself. Therefore we must eliminate that possibility and be left with no other option than to accept that "man acts" is true.

>>71986

>consider these concepts: approximation, projecting outcome(s) with some certainty (0..1

There is nothing to start off with. Approximations to complete unknowns don't mean a thing.

>>71988

It's not empirical. It's impossible to think outside it.

>>72002

Formal logic can no stand for concepts of quality. It's done little more than present of image a "hard science" would to be more acceptable among snobs and pseudo-intellectuals. The only thing you can express in it is quantitative relations of having one,more or no units.>>72002

>>Proof is data that when perceived remains consistent with the axioms of logic.

>"Proof" (uncountable) refers to the body of evidence that corroborates an empirical claim. "Proofs" (countable) describe collections of propositions which demonstrate the logical necessity of a given relationship, principle, axiom, etc. You can never have "proof" of the Pythagorean Theorem because it isn't an empirical proposition, but you can have "A proof" of it, which demonstrates that it must be the case. Such analytical propositions are not falsifiable, and so any attempt at empirical corroboration encounters logical problems.

You can't empirically prove your very frame of thinking. That doesn't really make it a "problem". You will never be able to think outside the law of Identity. The problem is entirely theoretical with no bearing to practical reality. Might as well consider all your knowledge null until you can empirically prove yourself existing outside your senses.

>>72022

*this shit happens when you don't read what you post after editing it

To my excuse I'm on prescribed drugs. There's still enough coherence in that post.

>>72002

>Since asserting that "man acts" is false necessarily requires man to act in doing so

I wonder about this.. seems like they are conflating empirical actions and abstract descriptions, statements, logic

>things which cannot be quantified

quantification is just mapping it to some metric. I dont have a proof at hand but would take most bets that you can do that to any object.

>such as individual preferences

perhaps you have a proof why those are unquantifiable?

>it's that quantity cannot accurately describe these concepts

do you mean adequate? because the potential accuracy will be capped only on the metric you map it to (and |R has infinitely small increment, so absolute accuracy)

>>72022

>It's impossible to think outside it

so it is backed by empiricism? since thinking happens in the empirical

>There is nothing to start off with. Approximations to complete unknowns don't mean a thing.

no info would be picking actions arbitrarily, as you say. do we really have zero information though? youre thinking about stuff right? or at least I am. so there are some intelligences with some information

and then approximate what the poster I first responded to called 'systematize and process' - and I 'qualitative models'

>>72024

>because the potential accuracy will be capped only on the metric you map it to

BY the metric not on

>>72023

damit its contagious

>>72022

>>72024

Thought and sense are only vague categories of knowledge.

>>72024

>so it is backed by empiricism? since thinking happens in the empirical

You can observe people acting. It doesn't mean you need to in order to confirm it. A causeless reality is incomprehensible no matter the experience. To attempt to prove the action axiom by acting would require to observe all action. The axiom is not a condition to be verified since its own comprehension requires you to use it. You can not abstract yourself from it, making experience useless in proving it wrong or right.

>do we really have zero information though

We don't have the time nor resources to calculate each person's unique conditions in relation to his perception of reality. As of now we don't have objective means to confirm even a single person's specific parameters, much less a group. Neuroscience and genetics are still not even close to that. When they get there I'm not going to object outside of normative issues.

>damit its contagious

I'm on a bunch of antibiotics and cough syrup that's making me dizzy. Can't ride my bike with my feet feeling wobbly so I thought I could stay at home today and at least shitpost properly.

>>72027

>The axiom is not a condition to be verified since its own comprehension requires you to use it

yeah thats what I mean with its backed by empiricism: it only holds up if there is a certain action in the empirical

seems like mises etc are making a mistake here since the realm of truth, the abstract, description etc is seperate and independed from reality

>>72022

>Formal logic can no stand for concepts of quality.

How do you justify this assertion? Why can't formal logic address qualitative features?

>You can't empirically prove your very frame of thinking.

Yeah, that's kinda part of what I said.

>The problem is entirely theoretical with no bearing to practical reality.

Except for the fact that this underpins our entire capacity for epistemology. Get rid of that and all discussion is non-referential.

>Might as well consider all your knowledge null until you can empirically prove yourself existing outside your senses.

This gives me the impression that you've wholly missed my meaning, here. All I'm doing is distinguishing between "proof" and "a proof"; between empiricism and rationalism. Both work just fine, for their respective types of questions and knowledge.

Nothing can be empirically proven independently of sense data. That's what empiricism is; corroborating propositions with sense data.

>>72024

>I wonder about this.. seems like they are conflating empirical actions and abstract descriptions, statements, logic

I can see where that line of thought would be tempting, but that's not quite what's happening. It is simply acknowledging that any argument necessarily has an arguer; nothing can be asserted without someone to assert it. That assertion is an action. Thus, as a matter of pure logic, independent of any observation we might make, we know that no assertion can ever be made that man does not act without simultaneously demonstrating that man does act. It is purely by definition that we know this; the argument does not reference any observation and thus is not in any way empirical.

>I dont have a proof at hand but would take most bets that you can do that to any object.

Any object can certainly be measured in some ways, but that does not mean that all abstract qualities and relationships of those objects are themselves quantifiable.

>perhaps you have a proof why those are unquantifiable?

Because they are subjective. That which is subjective can only be known by the individual, and thus no quantitative value can be objectively asserted. Even if we subjectively attribute some magnitude to it, we cannot do so in an epistemologically meaningful way. This is part of the reason why preference is said to be ordinal rather than cardinal; we can rank our preferences and even demonstrate that ordinality empirically through action, but we cannot demonstrate a magnitude of these preferences due to subjectivity. The best we can achieve is an intersubjective measure through a price mechanism, but even this measure faces empirical problems due to decreasing marginal utility.

>do you mean adequate?

In the context I was using it, you may use either. I was not using the word "accurate" in a technical sense. I was referring to a vague notion of conceptual accuracy; while we may use numbers to describe the ordinality of our preferences, we cannot describe their cardinality in this fashion. I was trying to convey the idea that we have a vague sense of magnitude with relation to our preferences, but the sense in which that has been intellectualized is not a faithful representation of reality, though the mistake is an understandable one.