>>75545
>Late medieval is Renaissance, which brought challenges to the traditional doctrine of divine right
No, the Rennaissance succeeded the late medieval era, and the legal structure of monarchism has continuously changed for centuries.
>You're really playing fast and loose with the definition of 'sovereignty', aren't you?
I didn't define it, and neither have you. If you think we should clear up the terminology, then why aren't you doing that? Or, why haven't you done it from the very beginning?
Be that as it may, you ignored my point, which was that the very structure of the state back then was different. It was different both in law and philosophy and in how authority and power were actually vested.
>It was absolutism under feudalism (just with unofficial limitation on the king's power by his dependence on the lords for soldiers), firstly, and secondly, it was still feudalism in the Renaissance. Charles 1's struggle with parliament leading up to the English Civil War doesn't make any sense unless it was feudalism.
The "unofficial" limitation on the kings power was absolutely official. That was the entire gig of the whole system of feudalism, that the king depended on his lords, they depended on their vassals, and so on. Hence why the Magna Charta was written in the form of a contract, not a mere statute. Contracts all presuppose a certain equality between the parties. A contract between a slave and his owner would be just as absurd as a contract between a dictator and his subject.
Speaking of parliaments, they originally started as a feudal institution, at least in the medieval era (not sure about the Greeks and Romans in this regard). The king called on them to ensure that his decrees would actually be carried out, because he did not have absolute authority over his subjects and had to gain their consent. I don't think China, with its history of officialdom, ever had parliaments, up until recently. Peru under the Incas, which was even more centralized, certainly didn't. This shows again that the king didn't hold the kind of power you say he did.
>"L'etat c'est moi"
Yes, and also:
>he swore to protect for everyone what the law pertains to him, which you'll notice presumses that the job of the king was to protect rights that already existed prior to his rule
Which can be reconciled easily with the above quote if we assume that back then, the state was not seen as identical with the legal order, nor as its creator. If anything, this is another point in favor of what I said.
>Yes, it does, but the thing was this was the ideal. It was equally held that the king had the authority to strip them of their rights and they weren't to do anything about it because the king would have a real bad time in hell instead.
Only under Martin Luther did that become the doctrine, while Saint Aquinas - the scholastic philosopher - defended the right of resistance and even regicide, and claimed that to act against your conscience is sin, which means that if you really feel like you must kill the king, killing him is not a sin (simplified). This is also reflected in the rulership of Protestant kings compared to Catholics, and even in the behavior of countries with a Catholic history compared with those that were Protestant (or, in the case of the US, colonies - Anglicans were the worst, Puritans followed up, and Catholics were generally the most tolerant).
>Aquinas' teaching is less about rights and more about good deeds, scholastic natural law is primarily about a natural inclination toward God's law.
Look here: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2095.htm
>As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above (I-II:91:2 ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.
His theory of natural law definitely had legal implications. It was not just a guide for personal conduct.