>>63804
Verdict-for-hire is not a good business model for a court. Imagine if you did it openly: You hire a court, it sends the verdict to the other party and enforces it. Obviously, such a verdict would not be seen as legally binding by anyone. It would be a pure formality. You could just as well ignore getting the verdict and rob the other party directly. However, if you did that, no one would like to do business with you anymore, you'd run at risk of being retaliated against (in a world where everyone can own an anti-aircraft cannon if he wants to), you'd waste time on the enforcement itself and people would form defense organizations to oppose you. It's extremely unlikely that a business plan like that would succeed. Similar plans have been executed, but even they have never been that bold and they have always relied on the state, because the state gives them moral legitimacy and allows them to externalize the costs of aggression.
The problem, then, would be corrupt courts that will work in your favor. Yet what prevents that now? Judges are often paid like shit if you take their long training into account. In fact, they're paid a flat fee no matter how large the case and often no matter much work they actually do. I know these people, they will try all kinds of tricks to finish up a case even if they don't admit it, which they wouldn't do if they were paid fairly. Yet I've never caught one of them acting on a bribe, despite these economic incentives. That's because they have an ethos that forbids them to be bribed. I admit that even though I don't like judges. Some of them are fucking sharks and proud of it, but they're not bribable. (I'm more concerned that some government districts have the court caught in the middle of ten ministries and the parliament. How's that for impartiality?)
If the same ethos were present, judges in Ancapistan would actually me more reliable, because they would be more flexible when it comes to payment. In a case worth two million dollars, they would demand upfront that they be paid a hundred thousand or so, so there would be less room for bribery. The reason why that ethos would be present, besides ideological factors, is the selection of the market. A corrupt court doesn't effectively render the services of arbitration and of giving justice. Any party that wants either of these things, which also include multibillion dollar corporations, would select a court that they know cannot be bribed. Even the ones that would rather want to bribe the court would still prefer an honest one unless they were sure their attempt at bribery would be successful, because they don't want to be at the mercy of a corrupt court when the other party is just as corrupt as them. Whether they can ultimately outbid that other corrupt party or not, the whole affair would just be more costly. They would only want to bribe the court when they know the other party cannot do so, but what court would risk that if it could potentially ruin any relationship with the far more numerous clients that want justice and arbitration? At worst, the court will be declared rogue and we're back to verdicts being issues as a formality before you rob someone, which, as I said, is not a good business model.