>>548395
First, never judge rashly. Taking facts into account and being (reasonably; unreasonable, hardened scepticism in face of solid facts or where there is no reason for it seems to be sinful for the same reasons as rash judgement) sceptical is healthy and needed, but never jump from thinking that something is possible to having a set and sure judgement about your neighbour without all the evidence that would be necessary to lawfully hold such a conviction.
https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/dictionary/index.cfm?id=35965
>How many times can God forgive you for committing the same sin, over and over, in very much the same context?
Enough for you to be saved if only you cooperate with God's grace needed for it, which He will absolutely certainly provide, no matter how evil you are.
>I have a problem with getting mad and hateful towards these two fags at work
Your description isn't precise enough to decide the moral character of this; it could be anything from just anger to gravely evil rash judgement. You definitely seem to be sinfully hateful though, especially in wishing them hellfire; as long as it's possible for them to repent, this is extremely opposed to the obligation of loving your neighbour, and dangerously similar to the sin of spiritual envy. Best option would be to read about the theology of these matters and apply the theoretical principles you find to practical situations you encounter in your life. Here are some basics:
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01489a.htm
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07149b.htm
Callan's and McHugh's "Moral Theology" contains these guidelines:
>1199. The duty of reconciliation does not necessitate the forgiveness of every kind of wrong suffered from an enemy—that is, it does not always oblige one freely to remit the consequences of an enemy's acts. There are three kinds of wrong: (a) offenses, which are such contradictions offered to the will of another as do not trespass on any strict right or occasion any damage. Example: Balbus, who is in great distress, asks his friend Titus to secure employment for him. Titus could easily do this favor, but he refuses; (b) injuries, which are violations of the strict right of another, but without damage. Example: Claudia addresses Caia in very disrespectful language when no witnesses are present; (c) damages, which are the taking from another of what is his, or harm done to him as regards his soul, his life, his fame, or his fortune. Examples are theft, scandal, assault and slander.
>1200. Whether an offender asks pardon or not, one is obliged to forgive the offense—that is, to put aside all aversion, indignation and hatred: "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us" (Matt., vi. 12). But, granting that one desires salvation for the offender as for others, shows the common signs of charity, and is not prompted by hatred, the following are not required: (a) that one so pardon the offense as to take the offender back to the same special friendship as may have existed before; (b) that one overlook an injury so as not to require satisfaction (and hence, without acting against charity, Gaia may insist on an apology from Claudia for the disrespectful language used by the latter); and (c) that one renounce restitution or reparation for damage done one. No one is obliged to give to another what is one's own, and, if there is no other way of securing one's rights, one may have recourse to court. If the result of prosecution will be punishment of the offender rather than restitution (as in case of libel or slander), it is not uncharitable to prosecute the offender, if one's motive is the fulfillment of justice, the prevention of the same wrong to others, or the honor of one's family (Lev., xix. 17).