>>1063003
Uh, yes it is still accurate. Just no one is speaking about it (coincidence?). Fortunately Tor's own site admits the issues in a roundabout way of course: https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq (2019 recent enough?)
>The directory authorities provide a signed list of all the known relays, and in that list are a set of certificates from each relay (self-signed by their identity key) specifying their keys, locations, exit policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can control a majority of the directory authorities (as of 2012 there are 8 directory authorities), they can't trick the Tor client into using other Tor relays.
So the adversary CAN trick the Tor client into using other Tor relays if he can control the directory authorities.
>How do clients know what the directory authorities are? The Tor software comes with a built-in list of location and public key for each directory authority.