/tech/ - Technology★

>>1002072 (OP)

>what guarantee do you have your network encryption isn't MITM'd all of the time?

Certificate authorities exist although it can't be a guarantee that you won't be fed bad certs, atleast it is a safeguard.

Good question. You don't, it's about minimizing the risk.

I know Tor is completely compromised or ineffective, yet I continue using it because I feel more secure.

I wish browsers were offline-first and aggressively caches every single resource then asks me whether I want to re-visit the X hour old page or update it.

>>1002092

It gives feds a big headache and the way it works they usually have to spend too much time to make it worth it. Unless you're an actual big-shot making millions.

Nothing is preventing you from with precursing tor with non disclosing VPN service as well.

>>1002093

The bigger problem with Tor is how often it is blocked or otherwise made inconvenient to use by anonymity-hating webdevs.

>>1002094

Yeah it is, but that's just a (((Coincidence)))

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uYg_0Imrnr4

>>1002072 (OP)

>how come you feel confident trusting HTTPS and Tor and whatever else is encrypted on the net

Because the extent of my trust in HTTPS and Tor and whatever else is "it prevents skiddie MITM."

>>1002094

>webdevs

global active adversaries including but not limited to Cloudflare, Google

>>1002099

That too. But it's often the webdevs themselves who disable tor believeing it's the "thing that spammers and pedos use".

>>1002092

>I know Tor is completely compromised or ineffective

One would think the Torproject would stop if that were true. Do you have actual reasons to believe know Tor (the network? the browser?) is busted or are you just paranoid?

>Tor

my adversaries do not include government agencies. for this, Tor is reasonably safe

>HTTPS

i don't have much alternative for many necessary sites

>>1002091

>>1002093

these

>>1002073

Certificate authorities only prevent your local coffee shop owner from MITM'ing you. All of SSL is designed around the CAs as the core weakness, which enables ezpz MITM by nation states. In the US, the CALEA act compels the backdoor to SSL/HTTPS. since like 1995. Verisign, the first CA, was selling 'CALEA compliance' to MITM SSL since like 1996.

Seriously, it's useless.

I wonder about some smaller or darker nets. Darker than I2P. Let's say non-internets.

I wonder how far USA agencies a

>>1002591 (i didn't even press enter)

re into networks such as Cuba's, or smaller meshnets. it's probably insignificant to infiltrate and not going to happen incidentally, so there is a good chance most of them are free of all North American surveillance and botnet