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Talks continued in Doha, and in February 2020, Trump announced that there was a deal. The basic contours: The United States was to get out of Afghanistan in 14 months and, in exchange, the Taliban agreed not to let Afghanistan become a haven for terrorists. The Taliban also agreed to start peace talks with the Afghan government and consider a cease-fire with the government. (The Taliban had been killing Afghan forces throughout this, attempting to use the violence as leverage in negotiations, U.S. intelligence officials believed.)

The deal laid out an explicit timetable for the United States and NATO to pull out their forces: In the first 100 days or so, they would reduce troops from 14,000 to 8,600 and leave five military bases. Over the next nine months, they would vacate all the rest. “The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will complete withdrawal of all remaining forces from Afghanistan within the remaining nine and a half (9.5) months,” the deal reads. “The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will withdraw all their forces from remaining bases.”

The United States would release 5,000 Taliban prisoners; the Taliban would release 1,000 of its prisoners.

The Taliban’s end of the deal asked a lot from the group — too much to be realistic, critics said. In addition to making sure nowhere in the country harbored a terrorist cell, the Taliban agreed to be responsible for any individual who might want to attack the United States from Afghanistan, including new immigrants to the country.

The Taliban “will send a clear message that those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies have no place in Afghanistan,” the deal read. And the Taliban agreed to “prevent any group or individual in Afghanistan from threatening the security of the United States and its allies, and will prevent them from recruiting, training, and fundraising and will not host them in accordance with the commitments in this agreement.”

This deal required taking the Taliban’s promises on faith.

“I really believe the Taliban wants to do something to show that we’re not all wasting time,” Trump said as he announced the agreement.

TRUMP'S SWEET DEAL FOR THE TALIBAN

One gaping problem, say scholars (including from the Trump administration): The peace agreement came withno enforcement mechanism for the Taliban to keep its word.

The Taliban basically had to sign a pledge saying it wouldn’t harbor terrorists. Nowhere did the Taliban have to - nor did it choose to - denounce al-Qaeda, the terrorist group that launched the 9/11 attacks from Afghanistan.

The biggest tangible commitment from the Taliban looked like this:For seven days before the deal was signed, its leaders significantly reduced their attacks on Afghan forces to show they were capable of controlling the group across the country. But the deal didn’t require that the Taliban stop its attacks against Afghan security forces.

Overall, it was a sweet deal for the Taliban, with no accountability or solid guarantees required, critics said. “Trump all but assured the future course of events would reflect the Taliban’s interests far more than the United States’,”. H.R., McMaster,Trump’s second national security adviser, has recently called it “a surrender agreement with the Taliban.”Another member of Trump’s National Security Council said it was “a very weak agreement.”

CRACKS IN THE DEAL EMERGE IMMEDIATELY

A few months after the agreement was signed, there was plenty of evidence that the Taliban wasn’t as sincere as it appeared about peace. The United Nations said it had evidence that the Taliban and al-Qaeda still had ties. U.S. intelligence warned that al-Qaeda was “integrated” into the Taliban. The Taliban launched dozens of attacks in Afghanistan, ramping up its violence.

“The Taliban views the negotiations as a necessary step to ensure the removal of U.S. and other foreign troops under the U.S.-Taliban agreement, but the Taliban likely does not perceive that it has any obligation to make substantive concessions or compromises," a U.S. inspector general report read.

It was all enough that when Biden came into office, U.S. officials questioned whether the Taliban was breaking its side of the deal.

BUT TRUMP CHOSE TO STICK WITH HIS STUPID PLAN

It’s important to remember that by the time Trump came into office, the public debate on whether to stay in Afghanistan was largely over. Most Americans were done with the war. Even the military realized it couldn’t effect much more change on the current course. “The only way forward was going to be a political agreement,” Mark T. Esper, Trump’s former defense secretary, said recently. “Not a military solution.”

To a number of those who were paying attention, the whole deal felt like a naked attempt to just get out of Afghanistan.It was a campaign promise of Trump’s to be the president who finally ended America’s longest war. It would be something no other president had been able to accomplish.

Before the peace talks really got going, Trump had already started withdrawing thousands of troops, and he fired his defense secretary, Esper, after he wrote a memo disagreeing. (Esper later said that Trump’s withdrawing too many troops too soon contributed to what we see now in Afghanistan.)

BIDEN CRITICIZES DEAL, BUT STICKS TO IT

When Biden took over, there were just 3,500 U.S. troops left in the country (from a high of 100,000 during the Obama years). He pushed back the date of the planned withdrawal from May 1 to four months later, but he kept the deal intact. U.S. troops would be out of Afghanistan by the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

“It’s time to end America’s longest war,” he said.

The Taliban didn’t even wait for the Americans to completely leave before they took over the country in a matter of days. As the world watched Kabul fall, Biden defended his decision not to stay and fight by saying Trump’s deal required him to either maintain the withdrawal or escalate fighting.

“When I became president, I faced a choice — follow through on the deal, with a brief extension to get our forces and our allies’ forces out safely, or ramp up our presence and send more American troops to fight once again in another country’s civil conflict,” he said in a statement.

Critics have contended that’s a false choice, noting how many other international agreements of Trump’s that Biden has eschewed or rewritten. But given that Biden shared the goal to withdraw, it left him little leverage to renegotiate with the Taliban.

For both presidents, the peace deal with the Taliban presented a good opportunity to pursue their own agendas with regard to America’s longest war. And neither has seemed particularly regretful about doing so.

“Leaving having proposed a peace effort and then blaming the Afghans for not reaching peace is as good a cover for leaving as any,” said Anthony Cordesman, a Middle East expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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Tony Schwartz, who ghostwrote The Art of the Deal and helped build President Donald Trump’s false reputation as a savvy businessman, has now spent about three years making it extremely clear that he never wanted any of this.

Now, that message also comes with a note to his publisher. Schwartz tweeted Wednesday evening that he would “be fine if Random House simply took the book out of print. Or recategorized it as fiction.”

His statement came in response to a report The New York Times published on Tuesday showing that from 1985 to 1994, Trump reported $1.17 billion in losses on his federal income taxes. From year to year, he lost “more money than nearly any other individual American taxpayer,” the paper reported.

Schwartz said on Twitter that he did not know about these losses at the time he wrote the book.

This is far from the first time Schwartz has publicly denounced the book, for which he interviewed Trump over the course of a year and a half in the mid-1980s. In the summer of 2016, as the presidential election approached and Trump’s campaign was at full steam, The New Yorker published a long feature on Schwartz, who until the presidential campaign had not talked about The Art of the Deal in decades.

Schwartz told The New Yorker‘s Jane Meyer that he deeply regretted his role in mythologizing the man who he now believed could “lead to the end of civilization.” Today, he would title the book “The Sociopath,” he said.

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