/liberty/ - Liberty

>>59655

It's not mainstream anymore because the conclusions it leads to aren't beneficial to the powers that be.

>unproveable

You can prove it wrong, just not by citing historical examples that are only vaguely relevant. You've got to look at the chain of reasoning, find the faulty assumption, and correct it.

>>59655

>Can you give me a quick rundown on praxeology without me having to read a 800 page book to understand the gist of it? Why is it legit?

Praxeology is the science of human action. It lays down the conditions of actions and the principles guiding them. It is an a priori science, with its first law that human beings act. This must be true, because it cannot be coherently denied. To say that human beings do not act is an action in itself. Actions are defined by the fact that they serve a specific end laid out by the actor. Their opposite are mere reflexes that are not guided by such an end.

From the action principle, several other laws follow. For example, human beings have a time preference; they desire the satisfaction of wants in the present over that in the future. If that wasn't the case, if they were indifferent to time, they would never act. Time preference explains interest rates: Because I want the satisfaction from having my money now and not later, I will not lend to you unless that brings me greater satisfaction than owning the money now. So you have to pay me interest, or I have to derive satisfaction from helping you out.

It is also inconceivable that human beings would undertake an action that didn't satisfy a want. Apparent contradictory cases, like suicides, still satisfy a want, and thus fit into the praxeological framework. It is important to remember that praxeology is purely descriptive. To say that an action fulfills a want is not to say that it's good. You can still judge an action on ethical grounds, but that's not the task of praxeology.

And I believe that's the gist of it. Describing all the ramifications of the action principle would take a few pages, sorry.

>Why isn't it accepted then in mainstream meteor economics?

It was largely developed from an immigrant that fled from the Nazis and was unknown in his new home, America. By the time it was developed, the governments already got bigger and had no use for a science telling them that all their pet projects will be useless. It also went against the academic current, with its focus on numbers and methodologies based on the natural sciences.

Frankly, it was bad luck. In another time, Mises may have become the foremost economist in the world. It's not like

>Can you demonstrate something according to its principles?

Well, interest rate, as before. Do you mean whether it can make predictions? That's not what it's made for, but sure, you can make predictions. You can predict, for example, that when your central bank lowers the interest rate below the rate of originary interest, capitalists will invest in the wrong endeavors, as they will assume that the time preference of the people is below what it actually is. So they will invest in projects for which savings are inadequate, and then will not be able to end these projects and will divert resources from projects that would better serve current wants and for which enough capital exists. That's the Austrian Business Cycle Theory, in a form that's kinda butchered, but hopefully still somewhat understandable.

Of course, these predictions are not perfect. They cannot be. A country with inflationist policies, a high minimum wage and tariffs might still expect large economic growth. We can only say that without these policies, the growth would be higher, but not how high it would be.

>>59655

>>59656

Also, this:

>You can prove it wrong, just not by citing historical examples that are only vaguely relevant. You've got to look at the chain of reasoning, find the faulty assumption, and correct it.

Historical examples are only useful as demonstrations of a principle or as a form of reality check. They couldn't possibly disprove the laws of praxeology. Instead, history has to be interpreted with these laws in mind. That is something the historical school didn't get. They honestly claimed that the economic laws that applied to Rome do not apply to later periods. This is a pretty damn absurd claim, but thankfully, the historical school doesn't exist in this pure form anymore.

>>59657

>You can predict, for example, that when your central bank lowers the interest rate below the rate of originary interest, capitalists will invest in the wrong endeavors, as they will assume that the time preference of the people is below what it actually is.

That's getting even more complicated today now that there is a group that is very well aware of market distortion and tries to play around it. Of course, they only know something is off, without the real economic data they can't accurately predict anyway.

>>59660

>Thank you all for the answers.

You're welcome!

>I suspect you are the ancap who has briefly explained it to me a long time ago when I only came to the board.

Could be it.

>But that does not take into account distinction between conscious and intuitive actions. Not reflexes, but such things as habits e.g. doing a wrong turn (which is part of another daily route) from your intended current route while being sunk in thoughts.

Praxeologially, these are actions. You may not think a lot of them and you especially don't overthink their effectiveness, but nevertheless, they're action. Praxeologically, taking a wrong turn while driving because you're lost in thought is not any different from making a blunder at the stock exchange.

>Also how does it quantify actions, such as walking to the grocery store for example? Is it through each step or through each muscle movement or by the overall goal which the actions combine towards?

Deciding to go on a walk is one action. Then, each consecutive step you planned out is a separate action. The movement of the muscles only constitute actions insofar as they're consciously executed. Lifting your leg and putting it back down are actions, but not every single muscle contraction qualifies as one. They're automated, but of course you're able to take conscious control of any muscle you choose. There are some people who cannot automate walking, they would have to do that by default.

>Then how does it distinct between long-term and short-term goals?

I don't think that distinction is relevant in praxeology. You can differentiate goals that are desirable per se and that are desirable because they serve some other goal in return, but in either case, the result is an action and can be understood as serving a purpose.

>And how does it qualify goals? I want to have breakfast so I want to buy something so I want to go to the store so I want to get out and so on and so on…. This is beginning to sound like one of Zeno's paradoxes.

Even an intermediate goal, like buying groceries so you can eat them later, relieves uneasiness. Theoretically, you could conceive of a Groundhog Day scenario in which one men constantly wakes up and goes out to buy groceries and then the day restarts. Whether he actually fulfills this goal (he won't) does not matter. He will still act because he thinks that he will fulfill it. Hence why I don't think a distinction between long- and short-term goals is relevant.

>If any of these questions are answered by Mises I'll give the praxeology book a shot, but if not then be kind and answer them here.

I didn't find an "official" answer to them, so these are my thoughts (which I hope someone else will add to). Although I could swear Mises had something to say on going out for a walk, but I cannot find it.

>From this sentence and seeing that Edmund Husserl influenced Mises, I am growing more and more suspicious that praxeology is just funnily worded Husserlian phenomenology, which Heidegger completely btfo'd btw.

I'm not aware of that, but I think I remember you asking that before. Got that essay (or whatever it is) from Heidegger somewhere?

>Then what is it actually made for? If it's not economical model then what? Is it useless observations by themselves that have to be supplemented by some other field or what?

Okay, I really put this the wrong way. You can make predictions of sorts, yes. With knowledge of the praxeological laws on the one hand and empirical data on the other, you can make certain predictions. What you cannot do is create a (supposedly) highly accurate model for the entire economy and quantify what the impact of a rise in wages in the agrarian sector by 5% will be. This kind of finetuning is unrealistic.

And yes, praxeology has to be supplemented in a way. The disutility of labor, for example, is a psychological and not a praxeological fact. It is entirely conceivable that human beings would want to do nothing but work, but we know that this isn't the case in our world from trivial observations.

>>59716

Game theory is an example of a non economics application for praxeology. As for non praxeological ancaps, David Freidman is your best bet. And human action is better off used as a reference book. I'd suggest economic science and the austrian method.

>>59716

>But these are fundamentally (as opposed to aesthetically - their goal or act) different actions. A blunder at the stock exchange is a miscalculation, it's akin to taking a wrong turn while thinking you've done the right one. Doing a wrong turn out of habit while being absorbed in thought is completely different. That action isn't done with intent, it isn't done with a want, it isn't even done consciously - it is completely automated.

Not completely. You can still interpret it according to the end it's supposed to serve, even if it's just "going the right direction" and you didn't actually think of where the right direction was. It's irrational in the sense that it cannot possibly achieve this end and that there was no reason to assume that it could, but still, it is an action.

>It's his entire life's work. What reminds me so much of Husserl's ideas in praxeology is the conscious "intention" or want that you mentioned. To quote the IEP:

>To say that thought is “intentional” is to say that it is of the nature of thought to be directed toward or about objects. To speak of the “intentional content” of a thought is to speak of the mode or way in which a thought is about an object.

>Phenomenology, if you're unfamiliar with the concept, is the study of consciousness through consciousness itself - think about it like neurology without the science and deductive reasoning instead. It wasn't that Husserl was (too) wrong, it's just that he wasn't fundamental enough in his inquiry, which is why I'm skeptical towards praxeology if Mises indeed built up his theory on Husserl. If Husserl was concerned with the content of thoughts, then Heidegger was concerned with the structure of our perception, it's like the difference between seeing what is in a room and seeing how the light within the room enables you to see it. That is what I meant about doing a wrong turn while being sunk in thoughts, it's a completely different way to analyze consciousness and therefore intent. And just to be clear, Heidegger doesn't imply that there is a subconscious. I recognize you by your writing style and lengthy responses, so if you're that one well-read ancap that keeps making threads about books I highly recommend you Husserl and Heidegger.

Thanks for the rundown, I'll see if I can find some of their works.

I appreciate the good questions, and that you kept an open mind. I definitely can't say that about everyone, sadly. But you're cool.

>I'll give the praxeology book a shot, but let me just ask you a few more questions on the topic.

Awesome! That's a good choice.

>Does praxeology extend to psychology? Which psychological schools/approaches utilize it?

Nah, those are separate domains. Praxeology just deals with action. Why a specific individual takes a particular action is a question of psychology. Praxeology accepts the fact that you have specific wants as a given, psychology can expound on it.

>Does praxeology consider the subconscious?

No, that's psychology. Praxeology says nothing about why you have specific wants. It is open to subconscious motivations for what you do.

>Is it a useful tool for anthropology?

Sure. Any historical analysis works, although I think anthropology contains a lot more psychology. However, I think things like tribal warfare or marriages could be analyzed very well with praxeology.

>And have any ancap thinkers, not necessarily related to praxeology, gave an account on how did statism and hierarchy begin?

Hoppe wrote one, A Short History of Man. In The Myth of National Defense, there are also a few essays in the beginning, but I forgot their names.

>Before reading Human Action, do I need to read any other works Mises draws upon? Or any ancaps that supplement Mises' work?

Choice, by Bob Murphy, is the most accesible way to learn about Mises, I think. Hoppe also wrote a great book, Economic Science and the Austrian Method, but it also contains many thoughts of his own. For example, halfway in, he starts talking about Kantian idealism and the relationship of discourse ethics and the action axiom. He wants to further the science with his book, whereas Murphy wrote a kind of beginners guide.

>Thanks

Hey, you're welcome!

>>59721

Flag, lol.

>>59716

>Does praxeology extend to psychology?

>Does praxeology consider the subconscious?

>Is it a useful tool for anthropology?

It is not the intent of praxeology to examine the reasons behind a particular action only that the action was chosen in the attempt to achieve a means to an end. Here is what Dr. Murphy has to say on what constitutes praxeology from his study guide on Rothbard's Man, Economy, and State

"Praxeology is the scientific study of human action, which is purposeful behavior. A human acts whenever he uses means to achieve an end that he or she subjectively values. Human action is thus teleological or intentional; a person acts for a reason. Therefore not all human behavior is action in the praxeological sense: purely reflexive or unconscious bodily movements (such as coughing when exposed to tear gas) are not examples of action. Praxeology starts from the undeniable axiom that human beings exist and act, and then logically deduces implications of this fact."

Praxeology would not look at the wrong turn made out of subconscious habit, but at the action of driving itself. The person decided to drive in order to achieve a means to an end, ie go grocery shopping or perhaps a booty call. Praxeology would not say that a person made a "blunder" at the stock exchange but only that the speculator/investor either bought or sold equities in order to achieve a means to an end.

>Or any ancaps that supplement Mises' work?

After Human Action read Rothbard's Man, Economy, and State with Power and Market. Get the study guides by Dr. Murphy as well as they help to solidify the key concepts.

>>59716

>Does praxeology extend to psychology? Which psychological schools/approaches utilize it?

Praxeology can only really say certain limited things about the content of one's mind. It can identify that action indicates preference, and the ordinal nature of value. However, it can't give detailed insight into a specific individual's particular preferences, partially because it recognizes that the interaction of ordinal preferences can be too complex to draw meaningful conclusions from limited observations.

I haven't read much about it, but from what I've read, the related field that seems to concern it more with an individual's specific values, knowledge, and preferences is known as "thymology".

It's not quite praxeology in psychology, but Thomas Szasz's work seems to apply certain praxeological insight to the field of psychology. Basically he notes much of the subjective nature of modern diagnosis and the fundamentally coercive nature of much of modern treatment. There's much more to read in his work, and many people reject it reflexively, but The Myth of Mental Illness opens new avenues of inquiry if you can read it with an open mind.

>Is it a useful tool for anthropology?

Praxeology is a study of human action, informing the field of economics. Human cultural history simply cannot be sufficiently understood without some economic insight into the incentives that generally shaped people's actions. It's a shame that few historians and anthropologists seem to concern themselves with a thorough understanding of economics.

>>59721

>A Short History of Man

Btw, there is an audiobook, if anybody is interested.

>>59749

Already read it, but thanks anyway!

>>59750

I am curios if the audio-book is of the entire book, or just parts from it, because in the audio-book he goes in depth in the hunter-gatherer societies, and then the agrarian ones, but skips the classical period(Roman and Greek Empires) and goes straight towards the medieval period, which isn't as in depth as the first ones, and then he talks about Democracy the God That Has Failed. I know it's a "short history", but I am curios if he actually skipped the classical period and why.

>>59754

Yeah, the book was written like that. It's actually three essays. All of Hoppes books tend to be essay anthologies and not so much coherent works like those of Rothbard or Mises. I know no one believes me, but he sometimes repeats whole sentences in one book, too. That's just one of his quirks.

>>59763

>Then I have one question left, what is the critique of praxeology? Whether from the left or right, preferably from the right.

Bryan Caplan might be your guy: http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/whyaust.htm

I haven't really evaluated what he says there, but he claims that the neoclassical school has surpassed the Austrian School by now.

>Would praxeology compel someone to be an ancap or can you still support some form of a state and believe in praxeology?

Well, Mises himself and many of his followers were minarchists, so you definitely can support the state and believe in praxeology. I don't think it's a good idea, obviously, but I wouldn't take the label "praxeologist" from anyone who wasn't an ancap.

>What about leftist application of praxeology, has that ever happened?

Not that I know of. The most left-wing it gets is probably Roderick T. Long, who's a pretty cool guy.

>>59763

>what is the critique of praxeology?

Usually it's criticized for being "unfalsifiable" by people trying to apply empirical standards to it. This is an error; it is unfalsifiable, but only because it does not in itself make empirical claims. It is unreasonable to judge it as an empirical method.

Because of its aprioristic nature, it is roundly rejected by positivists, since they paradoxically assert that nothing can be known analytically. Because praxeology does not rely upon, and in fact rejects the use of observational data in coming to conclusions, it is rejected by those whose concept of science is tragically limited to the "Scientific Method".

This is not to say that praxeologists reject the use of empirical data; only that they are careful to distinguish between economics (which they regard as aprioristic) and econometrics (which incorporates empirical data into the models generated praxeologically). These are regarded as different though connected disciplines.

>>59763

Essentially, there's no such thing as unfalsifiable.

>>59721

>You can still interpret it according to the end it's supposed to serve, even if it's just "going the right direction" and you didn't actually think of where the right direction was.

I would go even simpler and state that zoning out was a more preferable act than focusing on the road.

>>59826

>What does praxeology say of "mental acts"? Does it take into account thoughts as acts?

Again praxeology is the study of human action in which the action seeks a means to an end. Praxeology would not look at the day dream or meditative act itself only that you choose that act as a means to an end, ie solving a problem or stimulating your creativity, over something else such as tying your shoes or going to work etc. Thinking constitutes an act if you decide to do so. Dreaming while you are asleep does not. The action must seek a means to an end.

>But I'm talking about making a turn out of habit while daydreaming which is unrelated to the intended action. The "end which it's supposed to serve" of the turn, as the other anon said, just isn't there to be found.

A turn out of habit while driving is not human action from the sense of praxeology. It is instead a reflexive action, reactive in nature and more akin to instinct. Walking across a room would be human action as there was a means to an end for someone to begin walking. Each foot step would not be human action unless the operator is fully conscious of each decision to pick up and place down each foot, in turn keeping a conscious decision on the pace and rhythm of the walk. Praxeology is willful action.

>>59826

I apologize, when I say that something is "preferable," I mean it in the praxeological sense that an act occurs to remove the greatest feeling of unease at the point which the act was commenced, in this case daydreaming (out of pleasure, concern or satisfying exhaustion, or whatever). A direct choice between "daydreaming" and "focusing" does not need to exist for the commencement of daydreaming to be an act, despite the fact that the two might have overlapping consequences. The other anon should clarify his position if I'm misrepresenting it or correct me if I'm wrong, but the act of daydreaming and the act of making the turn can have related consequences despite being conducted to serve different ends. In this particular instance, the act of daydreaming takes praxeological precedence over the act of turning to reach point X.

>>59826

I'd like to add that referring to the wrong turn as "purposless" or "not satisfying" only examines the consequence rather than the act. In the case of both the stock broker and the driver, the act still commences. The undesirability of the consequence could have been avoided if the actor had better knowledge at the instance of making the decision, but such knowledge was obscured due to incomplete market knowledge or innatentiveness to the road (unless he's a masochist or something, in which case harming himself takes praxeological precedence). Praxeology is primarily concerned with the instance at which the action is decided upon. Whether you think a habit is the consequence of conscious or subconscious thought, there is still a cerebral feeling of unease which it removes at the moment of action.

>>59827

For something to be a reflex, it has to be outside of cerebral thought. From Wikipedia,

>A reflex, or reflex action, is an involuntary and nearly instantaneous movement in response to a stimulus.[1] [2] A reflex is made possible by neural pathways called reflex arcs which can act on an impulse before that impulse reaches the brain. The reflex is then an automatic response to a stimulus that does not receive or need conscious thought.[3]

Hence, habits are not reflexes, and can be examined praxeologically.

>>59837

I would argue against that, in that some habits are almost reflexive or at least lurking within the subconscious. We do not consciously decide about each loop we make when tying our shoes unless we are either learning or actively forcing ourselves to pay attention. Habits based out of muscle memory or of such repetition that they are removed from conscious decision are not human action. Daily habits are human action if we consciously decide to follow them in order to attain a desired end.

>>59839

Even by your definition, then, making a habitual mistake while driving somewhere without devoting exclusive attention to it should qualify as purposeful action, as this was intentionally giving in to habitual behavior.

>>59841

No, it wouldn't constitute a purposeful action if the conscious awareness of choice wasn't there. We do not always choose to day dream.

Bumping good bread.

>>59650

read feyerabend

Bump, mostly to save the quads.

>>70001

FUCK

>>70003

Go to gulag right now for being a filthy getfag.

>>71832

Not familiar with it yet, sorry. Although Comte is worth checking out, he's not that high on my priority list.

I know that thomistic ethics has elements resembling praxeology somewhat.

>>59657

>From the action principle, several other laws follow. For example, human beings have a time preference; they desire the satisfaction of wants in the present over that in the future. If that wasn't the case, if they were indifferent to time, they would never act

1. if I was indifferent to time I could act whenever. includes never but doesnt necessitate it

2. really dont see how 'x is an actor' implies 'x has a time preference'. I can see 'x has a time preference' implies 'x is an actor'. the other way seems fallacious though

>greater satisfaction

theres a big difference between preference and satisfaction. Id just keep it clean an stick with preference instead of fumbling around with the actor having a spefic justice (an essential precondition of something like satisfaction)

>It is also inconceivable that human beings would undertake an action that didn't satisfy a want

that is possible if the actor is acting arbitrarily.

on this note, 'humans act' is not the same as 'humans act with some purpose'

theres also some important differences between acting and decision making and even reasoning (wich is a part of decision making).

>praxeology is purely descriptive

I assume you mean 'praxeology is strictly descrptive and deductive'

>>79803

Sorry, cannot address this now, but letting you know I read this.

>>79811

You just don't get this level of politeness and civil discussion on any other boards.

Are we the master race?

>>79810

>second pic

One of the reasons I've decided to stop pursuing research physics and go into finance or some shit instead. In a lot of ways, modern science is just dead; there's no philosophy, almost no seeking of knowledge, just a bunch of socialists begging for more grant money.

>>79823

You jus jealous dey be more famous and more smarter dan u nigga.

You need reddit bruh.

>>77583

> here its all debunked

Not really, a good majority of it is just Caplan being purposefully obtuse due to his autism.

>>79803

>1. if I was indifferent to time I could act whenever. includes never but doesnt necessitate it

It does necessitate it. Praxeology does not describe when people can act, but when they do in fact act.

Concerning time-preference: If it didn't exist, it's not like actors could just pick any moment in time at which to act, and were just indifferent as to which. Think of this from the perspective of the guy without time-preference: He will never feel like he can't just wait longer to get what he wants.

>2. really dont see how 'x is an actor' implies 'x has a time preference'. I can see 'x has a time preference' implies 'x is an actor'. the other way seems fallacious though

That's got something to do with what I said above. When you see someone acting, then you know he must have a time-preference, because if he didn't have one, he wouldn't be acting. You really can reason in both directions. In the same vain, after all, you can conclude that it's raining when you see someone with an umbrella, or you can conclude that he will go out with his umbrella if you see that it's raining outside.

>theres a big difference between preference and satisfaction. Id just keep it clean an stick with preference instead of fumbling around with the actor having a spefic justice (an essential precondition of something like satisfaction)

That is fine. I don't like the word "satisfaction" that much either, it invites thinking of actors as hedonistic when you can also have a preference to die as a martyr.

>that is possible if the actor is acting arbitrarily.

Which isn't conceivable, not in a praxeological sense. Actors always pursue their preference, whether they succeed or not. They can be irrational in a psychological sense, of course, but not praxeological. For that, they'd have to act against their preference, but what logic could possibly underlie that?

>I assume you mean 'praxeology is strictly descrptive and deductive'

No, although that's also true. I mean it is descriptive in the sense that it doesn't concern itself with whether an action is ethical or not. It isn't a normative science. For example, time-preference isn't about whether it is good or rational that people prefer a good "now" and not "later". I've seen John Rawls misunderstand it in that way.

the world is a dangerous place, take this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_egoism

>>79925

This is literally babby's first philosophy. It's not even philosophy 101, because even before you have this shit in high school, you eventually figure out that from a certain perspective, everyone is acting selfishly. Most of us had this insight once, then put it at the back of the head and thought about more worthwhile things. We didn't make a "theory" out of it.

Personally, I think it's already dubious to call someone egoistic for doing what makes him happy if it's the sound of laughing children and tweeting birds that makes him happy. In my opinion, the meaning of virtue is precisely that you love goodness and hate evil.

>>79823

t. brainlet with cognitive dissonance

>>80972

Wow, you got me. There's no way I'll ever recover from such a complete rebuttal.