>>580849
>they weren't expecting NATO to jam all their shit
>Things that never happened.jpg.
Russia jammed Georgian Israeli and french made comms.
Not the other way around, NATO-style EW is fucking non-existent.
>>580849
>they managed to get a hold of the Kremlin with burner phones and landlines.
This did happened because the 58th army used regular legacy radios, they had like 2 satcoms for the entire 42nd division.
Long range radios just don't work in the mountains plain and simple. Never have, never will.
Short range tactical radio links worked just fine (and the command/control techniques for artillery they developed in Chechnya proved perfectly apt as the multiple small elements were able to guide precisely small artillery strikes, which are divided and linked sometime to a gun per platoon for example. Which largely helped negating Georgian manpower advantage) but to call upon command in Vladikavkaz or Moscow, or just keep in touch with the units on the other side of Roki tunnel to tell them what they needed to send across first, they had to use civilian lines else setup a stupid big relay radio net in every pass (which in retrospect they should have done earlier).
>>580848
>apparently they realized that their communication and command/control systems were inadequate to say the least.
Well the main problem wasn't the way the command/control system worked, if anything theirs worked very well, the 2 core issue were:
1) The Caucasus units weren't geared toward mechanized warfare, they were geared toward counter-insurgency. As such they were largely left out of modernization programs since most of their units were operating in company sized units against rebels used to worked in small combined units format but very rarely above battalion levels.
This resulted in small units used to work in small interarms groups but using completely outdated equipment.
2) That was compounded by the fact the Georgians were using the similar gear in aspect (Su-25 for example. The Su-25 factory was actually in Georgia IIRC), which created a serious IFF problem that would never had occurred when that old gear was designed.
Again while it was clearly flawed, it largely wasn't something that couldn't be fixed by straight up modernizing, because topology and poor reliability is the main reason why satcom is a thing.
On the plus side the Russian command noticed that the small units/small battery tactics the Caucasus units had developed in Chechnya and how a great autonomy of competent junior commanders was really really effective even against a real army in particular in an urban setting and generalized and modernized it (we've seen that again since in Ukraine and Syria).
>>580848
>I suspect that they were deemed adequate "enough" for grand, pre-planned manouvers that were expected during cold-war era european operations, and for operations in Afghanistan, which also were quite rigidly planned in regards of whatever long distance firesupport or airsupport was utilized.
Soviet armies were always inter-arm armies, the smallest soviet unit brigade/regiment were always interarms units.
A basic battalion always had all kind of attached fire support batteries (AT by, AA by, Arty by) and had organic fire support units (Mor co, AAA co) and therefore was always horizontal and vertical.
Soviet had very rigid doctrinal organizational responses to situations to palliate gigantic armies and passable junior officers that go with it… which is used by people with not much knowledge in such matters to deride them but frankly the array of those doctrinal responses indeed covered most situations just fine.
The idea that you will make shit up as you go only looks good on paper. It's fine if you're Rommel or Napoleon but rare are the officers of such caliber.
A textbook response isn't a bad thing if it's a good textbook…