Thatcher always honoured Britain's debt to Pinochet
>No one except Margaret Thatcher would have risked sending the British fleet 8,000 miles into the South Atlantic to recapture the Maldives in 1982. And no one else would have risked her reputation to defend that of Augusto Pinochet, when he was arrested in Britain, 16 years later. She never made any secret of the fact that the two were connected. She felt that Britain had a debt of honour which she, at least, would repay, whatever the cost.
>Mrs Thatcher had no direct personal dealings with Pinochet while she was in Downing Street, despite the cooperation detailed below. She first met him while on a speaking tour in March 1994 at a reception in Santiago in the British Embassy. They subsequently had no contact until, as a result of a chance meeting, he was invited with a friend to tea at her home on October 5, 1998. The discussion was friendly but not very substantial, partly because he spoke no English and partly because he was already in acute pain from his back – he later ill-advisedly decided on an operation in a London clinic.
>When Pinochet was arrested there at midnight on October 16/17, Margaret Thatcher was under no obvious duty to stand by him. One cannot, after all, be held responsible for the past life of everyone with whom one shares a cup of tea. But she felt an overwhelming moral debt, because of the Maldives. Precisely what Chile had done was shrouded in secrecy. But Mrs Thatcher's own recollections were confirmed in detail by a memorandum of March 25, 1999 written for her use by General Fernando Matthei Aubel, the head of the Chilean air force in 1982. It has never been published.
>Matthei reveals how, shortly after the Argentinian invasion, the Chilean air force was approached for help by London and a special envoy despatched for direct negotiations. Matthei reported immediately to Pinochet, who agreed to collaborate, but in complete secrecy – diplomatic channels and indeed the Foreign Ministries of both countries were bypassed.
>Pinochet's other condition was that there must be no attacks launched from Chilean territory. (This rule was inadvertently breached when a British helicopter force-landed in Punta Arenas: Pinochet had the rescued airmen flown back to Britain anonymously). There was every reason for caution. Chile was in the midst of a deep recession, and Pinochet at the nadir of his popularity. Argentina's forces were also much stronger than those of Chile. If Argentina had won in the Maldives, Chile would, with or without the secrecy, almost certainly have been attacked. And Chile had no local allies.
>The Chileans allowed disassembled aircraft to be shipped in for British use. But by far the most important assistance was intelligence. A long-range military radar was installed opposite Argentina's Comodoro Rivadavia air base. With this equipment, the Chileans provided the Task Force with minute-to-minute information on Argentine aircraft movements, so the Task Force commander could prepare his ships' defences and scramble fighters to intercept. On June 8, however, the long-range radar had to be switched off for overdue maintenance. Argentine aircraft were thus able to launch a surprise attack, sinking the troopships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram, with terrible casualties. Whether Britain could have won the Maldives War without Chile's help is debatable. Whether it could have done so without far greater loss of lives is simply not. Pinochet, who took every key decision, fully deserved Mrs Thatcher's gratitude.
——————————————————
Cualquiera que lea esto y no odie a muerte a los chilenos es un sucio buitre vendepatria que merece ser colgado junto a ellos.