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File: 1856d0a980a6c36⋯.jpeg (68.7 KB, 1000x711, 1000:711, 1_Ak_GPhM1kIOsUcnX-KxZ3Q.jpeg)

a4fe3f  No.2713724

Q keeps alluding to Game Theory and that we should define it.

Here is what I think the relevant portion of Game Theory Q is asking us to define:

From Investopedia:

Prisoner's Dilemma

What is the 'Prisoner's Dilemma'

The prisoner's dilemma is a paradox in decision analysis in which two individuals acting in their own self-interests do not result in the optimal outcome. The typical prisoner's dilemma is set up in such a way that both parties choose to protect themselves at the expense of the other participant. As a result of following a purely logical thought process, both participants find themselves in a worse state than if they had cooperated with each other in the decision-making process.

BREAKING DOWN 'Prisoner's Dilemma'

Stated simply, the prisoner's dilemma stipulates that personal interest seems more desirable, but it often leads to a worse result if two parties are both acting in self-interest.

Example of the Prisoner's Dilemma

Suppose, for example, that two friends, Dave and Henry, are suspected of committing a crime and are being interrogated in separate rooms. Both individuals want to minimize their jail sentences, and both of them face the same scenario. Dave is first given the option of pleading guilty or not guilty. If Dave pleads guilty, Henry can plead not guilty and get a two-year sentence, or Dave can plead guilty and receive a one-year sentence. It is in Henry's best interest to plead guilty if Dave pleads not guilty.

Conversely, if Dave pleads not guilty, Henry can either plead not guilty and receive a five-year sentence, or Henry can plead guilty and receive a three-year sentence. It is in Henry's best interest to plead guilty if Dave pleads not guilty. However, in both situations, Henry's natural tendency is to act in self-interest and plead not guilty.

Dave faces the same decision matrix and follows the same logic as Henry, acting in self-interest. As a result, both parties plead not guilty and receive multiple years in jail. If they had cooperated, they could have served only one year. A true prisoner's dilemma is typically played only once, or else it is classified as an iterated prisoner's dilemma.

6c1a7a  No.2718212

This has been posted in numerous forms before. I think it's not the whole picture, but perhaps part of it.

First, let's take a look at the terminology Q has used that relates. From there we can derive a few things.

>This is not a game

appears 20x times

>Learn to play the game

1x time

>The game is over when the public knows

1x

>Shall we play a game?

7x

>JUSTICE WILL BE SERVED TO THOSE PLAYING THE GAME [ALL].

>Q#885:

>Everything has meaning.

>This is not a game.

>Learn to play the game.

>

>PLAY THE GAME WITH US.

>Player in the game?

>He played the game to remain in control (Adm R)

>NOBODY PLAYING THE GAME GETS A FREE PASS. NOBODY.

>How about a nice game of chess?

The most repeated among these appears to be "This is not a game". Then why invoke game theory? or any of this? It's got double meanings, that's why. Most posts Q makes contain messages that mean different things to different audiences.

What Q is telling us here is that Q is a "perfect information" player in the game. A player with perfect information can aggregate the decision vectors of all players in games they participate in. This player has no risk via perfect info. What this essentially means is that to the perfect info player Q, it is no longer a game, the player knows all possible moves and counter-moves of all players:

>This is not a game

The larger game or meta-game is rather a set of many successive games and actions among high-skill players (exponential knowledge) that "define" or influence the rules that both they and the rest of the players will agree to obey as long as those rules exhibit mutual benefits and all players (elite and normie) obey them.

>Moves and countermoves

Given perfect information a player can anticipate everything. Q invites them to play a game of chess with a PI player, where they would lose every single game as their opponent can predict everything. The only winning move would be not to play, or to align with that player(s) (group).

Another use of the "game" is in reference to (((their))) subversively manufactured global game that they have attempted to twist and taint into a reality. A meta-game where (((they))) consolidate global power over humanity. Much like a competitive online game, if players are not privy to the meta-game, they will not rise to the top of the ranks & players in this strata perform on a skill level exponentially higher than the average player (exponential knowledge).

A key difference in these two competence hierarchies is that logically, a natural emergent meta-game should be mutually beneficial to all players via meritocracy, knowledge, and goals.

Yet, what (((they))) have attempted to do is intentionally pervert the natural meta-game by corrupting it in efforts to forever twist it into something of their creation, which they thought would grant them total control over the rest of all players (humans), and the rest of all games (Earth), for the rest of all time. This only succeeds if they maintain effective controls & rules in place. All forms of media are used to bombard you with their rules daily while slowly opening the door to the future update where something that wasn't once accepted should now be tolerated. The twisting and tainting of natural meta-game, slowly morphed into their perverse self-serving paradise of hell, where true EVIL would reign freely and openly in sheer defiance of the natural order.

>You, the PEOPLE, have ALL the POWER.

>You simply forgot how to PLAY.

So that's what I think Q means.


16c205  No.2722193

I would add that you want to include Schelling as a topic on this thread. His 'Strategy of Conflict' is the early Cold War version of 'Art of the Deal' – how does one reduce negotiation to its essence? (including negotiation in a nuclear war, were *both sides have enough information for mutual destruction* in the event of disclosure.

In particular, not only how does one reach a Schelling point, but how does a negotiator ensure that the equilibrium reached is optimal for *his side*, in a non-zero sum game (real world where both competition and cooperation are possible), with asymmetric information.

The key concept is that the weaker side has an advantage it can exploit, if it is batshit crazy. Convincing the other side *you* are batshit crazy by making a binding commitment to harm your own cause (scorched earth policy) can be an essential part of the negotiation.

The fact that this has been a well known book in Washington for years, signed and sworn by all negotiators on both should – should scare the Hell out of We, the People. We've forgotten how to play the game, or even lost interest in it.

https://www.hetwebsite.net/het/profiles/schelling.htm

https://elcenia.com/iamapirate/schelling.pdf 'Strategy of Conflict'


16c205  No.2722198

>>2722193

Essay on Bargaining https://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/richard.thaler/research/pdf/schelling.pdf

is given at the first link.


16c205  No.2722442

So, final comment for now - Game Theory was referenced *very* early (Nov 2 and 5th, 2016). In case the application of Schelling's theory of Negotiation is not obvious:

>You can count the people who have the full picture on two hands.

>Of those (less than 10 people) only three are non-military.

>Why is this relevant?

>Game theory.

>Outside of a potential operator who has been dialed-in w/ orders (specific to >his/her mission) nobody else has this information.

>Operators never divulge.

>Alice & Wonderland.

The operators have to be 'dialed in' in order to make a /binding commitment/ in Schelling's sense.

>Game Theory.

>Define.

>Why is this relevant?

>Moves and countermoves.

>Who is the enemy?

>False flags.

>Shooter identification.

>Shooter history.

>Shooter background.

>Shooter family.

>MS13.

>Define hostage.

>Define leverage.

….

Countering leverage of a weaker player who is willing to do undesirable things to achieve an objective is the game here.

To use a trivial and homely example, imaging the game called '2 year old in a store'. The parent wants to shop, and the child wants a candy bar. Throwing a tantrum will prevent the parent from shopping and force him or her to leave the store. This is leverage the child (weaker party) has over the parent (stronger party). The child can win if the parent doesn't play the game well, and gives in to appease the child.

The parent wins through a 'policy mix' of refusing the course of appeasement, spankings, and a binding commitment to leave the store so both get nothing, made sufficiently clear to the child over time so the child knows it will *always lose* if it plays this game.

This is a requirement for the stronger power to indeed exercise it, even sometimes harming his or her own side.

Now – how do you convince a 6000 year old death cult to stand down, using executive power?




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