>>610640
There's more politics involved in this story, but from a strictly military standpoint, the defeat of Japan in WW2 lies in the fact that the IJN and IJA were essentially two different armies with two irreconcilable war objectives that in the end, could not be integrated; to top it off both the IJA and IJN neglected the crucial aspect of intelligence and logistics, opting for the “HURR SAMURAI BLOOD YOU, IF THEY KILL YOU YOU WIN, GANBARE” option. Japan had an effective spy network during the Russo-Japanese war, but in World War 2, Japan had no spy network to speak of in the US, and they only had several people working on decoding American codes, while the Americans had hundreds of code crackers. As for logistics, Japanese soldiers were expected to fight without leave towards the middle of the war, and as for units defending remote islands, they were often there for months on end until they were rotated, but even this rotation of units were given up on towards the end, lowering the morale and thus the effectiveness of the troops.
Anyways, the IJN had always set the enemy as Russia (not so much towards late 1920~30), America and the UK (which I will shorten to America from here on, since UK was essentially moot in the pacific), and planned accordingly. The IJN wanted a quick and rapid war in which the IJN would inflict as much damage to American held territories and units that the Americans would seek a political peace in which Japan would gain resource rich territories in the pacific which will allow Japan to continue fighting in China etc. This option was agreed on by the Japanese leadership, and was pursued, albeit with a large number of annoyed IJA generals and top brass.
Meanwhile the IJA had always set their adversaries as Russia and China, and saw a need to develop new weapons and techniques to fight in large open fields and tundras as found in those nations and did so effectively for the most part; their biggest strength was in defending the ground they have , and to literally throw themselves forwards once the attacker had worn themselves out. However, since the IJN had essentially won in the political realm, the IJA wanted in on the action, and half forced the emperor to give them a piece of action in the Pacific. The IJA, after successfully taking over the Malay states, the Phillipines, and other major colonies, were content on defending their ground until the navy could take out Midway. The IJN failed utterly due to a lack of intelligence or rather lack of countering enemy intelligence, and lost utterly.
From there, the navy could no longer support the infantry both as a fighting force and logistical force, and since the infantry were originally trained to fight in fields and tundras, and still taught to continue defending their ground until they could be reinforced (which was basically impossible), these Japanese troops were defeated pretty quickly each time the Americans landed.
Anyways learn moon runes and read 失敗の本質. It's a study done by several histoians hypothesizes that Japan could not win a war in the pacific, but trys to seek the reasons as to why the IJA and IJN lost so horrifically as they did.>>610640